The Manifesto of Hovhannes Katchaznouni First Prime Minister of the Independent Armenian RepublicTranslated from the Original by Matthew A. CallenderEdited by John Roy Carlson (Arthur A. Derounian)
Published by the Armenian Information ServiceSuite 7D, 471 Park Ave. New York 22 1955
AND
the omitted sections translated from the Turkish edition,Taşnak Partisi’nin Yapacağı Bir Şey Yok, Kaynak Yayınları, 2006, IstanbulBy Lale Akalın 2006
Kindly provided by Mr Doğu Perinçek http://www.ip.org.tr/
Translator’s Note to the present editionThe report you are holding in your hands was delivered to theDashnatziun Congress convened in Bucharest, in April 1923 by HovhannesKatchaznouni, the first prime-minister of the Armenian Republic founded in1918.The original report was naturally delivered in Armenian and waspublished in Armenian by the author himself. It was translated to Russianand published in Tiflis (Tbilisi), four years later, in 1927 under Soviet rule,with a rather critical introductory note attached to it. The English translation,an abridged edition, was published in 1955 by the “Armenian InformationService” in New York.What is remarkable is that this very interesting historical documentshedding light over a controversial period of history written by a person whoplayed a crucial role in the life of Armenia has not been included among thedocuments flying about in the air in relation to the Armenian question. Itscopies were removed from the libraries in Europe by the Dashnagziunmembers. A Russian copy in the Lenin Library in Moskow has very recentlybeen translated into Turkish. This Turkish translation was compared with the1955 abridged English edition and the parts left out in the English editionwere supplemented from the Turkish 2005 edition and translated into Englishin order to arrive at the present English translation.When I was suggested translating the omitted sections of the reportinto English so that it would be published as an unabridged edition, I, likemost of my fellow citizens, was feeling amazed and frustrated at the turn theevents were taking; amazed because of the immense and increasingpressure turning into an open threat by the “Western powers”, ie, the EU andthe USA concerning how “Turkey, as the successor of the Ottoman Empireshould admit responsibility on the ‘Armenian genocide’”; and frustratedbecause nobody has been willing to listen to what Turkey has to say and alsobecause the present Turkish government has been apologetic andcompromising in the face of these pressures. With these sentiments, Ireadily accepted the offer, and now I am glad that with this book, certainhistorical facts which have been pushed consciously aside by the powers thatprovoked an ethnic minority to rise against their own state almost a centuryago when it was being pulled apart by the the same imperialist wolves of theworld, will be coming into the open through the mouth of a person who wasone of the leaders of the provoked people.I believe that whether what happened in 1914-1923 was “genocide” orself defense of an empire which was being pulled apart is not what reallyinterests the “Western powers” . It is the effect that this propaganda willproduce on the world and Turkish public opinion that will open the way toincreasing their control over Turkey, ie, over the Middle-East, the oil, gas andtrade routes is what interests them. Unfortunately the western public opinionis under this influence because the propanganda is very powerful, for it isalso backed up with financial power. This book, the first among a serieswhich will supply historical evidence in Western languages, will be of help forthose who are willing to find out what really happened.3The two main allegations upon which Taner Akçam1 and others whoclaim that the Ittihat Terakki Party and mainly the head of government of the time, Talat Paşa was guilty of “genocide” base their claims is that the IttihatTerakki Party, under the influence of a nationalistic urge, was actually tryingto “purge” Anatolia of non-Turkish ethnicities and that Talat Paşa actuallysecretly gave the order to massacre Armenians as an ethnic group. This bookwill be an answer to the first allegation:” In the Fall of 1914 Armenianvolunteer bands organized themselves and fought against the Turks becausethey could not refrain themselves from organizing and refrain themselvesfrom fighting. This was an inevitable result of a psychology on which theArmenian people had nourished itself during an entire generation” saysKatchaznouni and adds: “The Winter of 1914 and the Spring of 1915 werethe periods of greatest enthusiasm and hope for all the Armenians in theCaucasus, including, of course, the Dashnagtzoutiun. We had no doubt thatthe war would end with the complete victory of the Allies; Turkey would bedefeated and dismembered, and its Armenian population would at last beliberated.We had embraced Russia whole-heartedly without anycompunction. Without any positive basis of fact we believed that the Tzaristgovernment would grant us a more-or-less broad self-government in theCaucasus and in the Armenian vilayets liberated from Turkey as a reward forour loyalty, our efforts and assistance”.Here I cannot help but quote another Armenian source quoted byMehmet Perinçek in his Foreword to the Turkish edition:“As the glorious Russian Armies are fighting against Turkey who,with German support has dared to raise its hand against mighty Russia, onthe lands in its own hegemony, in the snowy Armenian mountains and thevast Alashkert valley, the Armenians, taking the advice of their forefathers(…) have risen to sacrifice their lives and their assets to Great Russia and themagnificence of its throne.”2Katchaznouni evaluates the incidents of 1914-15 thus: “Thedeportations and mass exiles and massacres which took place during the Summer and Autumn of 1915 were mortal blows to the Armenian Cause. Half of historical Armenia -“ the same half where the foundations of our independence would be laid according to the traditions inherited by European diplomacy -“ that half was denuded of Armenians: the Armenian provinces of Turkey were without Armenians. The Turks knew what they were doing and have no reason to regret today. It was the most decisive method of extirpating the Armenian Question from Turkey” Is this an example of Genocide which means ‘a racial extermination based on no other reason but being a member of one race and not another’or a self-defence?1 See “Soykırım Suçunda Kasıt Unsuru Konusunda Bazı Notlar”, Birikim, sayı 1992 Mşak, No.271, 1914 cited in Prof. Dr Türkkaya Ataöv, An Armenian Source: Hovhannes Katchaznouni,Second Printing, Ankara, March 1995, cited in M.Perinçek, Taşnak Partisinin Yapacağı Bir şeyYok,Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p. 114 It should not be forgotten that while the Armenian bands, most of whom were Ottoman citizens were fighting the Ottoman State, the same State was fighting the British and the Greek on the Western front. The bloody Gallipoli Battles were fought in March-September 1915 against the multi national armies from the British colonies under the leadership of theBritish themselves. Was the Ottoman government, among all these bloody battles, suddenly seized by a racial fever and decided to exterminate the Armenians, or was the Empire fighting for survival on the eastern and western fronts? This is what Katchaznouni has to say for a few years later when Turkey was still figting on several fronts: “The Armenian-Turkish war which broke our back began in the Fall of 1920. Would it have been possible to evade it? Probably not. The crushed Turkey of 1918 had recovered during the two years. There came forward patriotic, young officers who formed anew army in Asia Minor. They saw the necessity of attacking in the Northeast, and in the Southwest against the Greeks which they could not do without first crushing their flank on the Armenian front. One cannot say thatthe Turks really had such a plan, but it is possible that they did and it wasalso probable that the war with us was inevitable.”Once more I would like to quote another source, again quoted byMehmet Perinçek: The Foreign Minister of the Dashnagzoutiun Governmentsays, in 19 in a telegram sent to the representative in Tiflis (Tbilisi):“The situation on the front is very grave. It is essential to see Luck andCorbeille and have them send telegrams to their governments informingthem of how the Turkish troops are advancing and demand that they take allthe necessary precautions (…) See the Greek representative too and demandthat he too send a telegram to his government to inform them of thesituation and to ask them if it is possible for the Greek forces to start anassault and break the strength of the Turkish forces”3At this point I feel I have to stop and let Katchaznouni speak.Lale Akalin3 D.S. Zavriev, K. Noveyşey, İstorii Severo-Vostoçnıh Vilayetov Turtsii, Tbilisi, 1947, s. 85. cited inM.Perinçek, Taşnak Partisinin Yapacağı Bir şey Yok,Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005,p.165Introduction to the Turkish EditionBy Mehmet PerinçekWe have been hearing arguments as to how the archives should beconsulted, in connection with the discussion of the Armenian question. Hereis a document from the Armenian archives. With this report by HovannesKatchaznouni, we are lifting the cover of the Armenian archives.We invite the whole world to study the Russian and the Armenianarchives, in order to bring out the truth. They are very rich in documents:reports by the Armenian authorities and government members of the timeand reports by Armenian commanders written to their seniors, documentspublished by reliable Armenian historians like Borian and Lalaian are all inthose archives as official documents.As the Kaynak Publishing House, we are commencing thepublication of the series, The Lie of ‘Armenian Genocide’ in ArmenianDocuments, with an official document, a report by the first prime-ministerof the first Armenian government and the leader of the Dashnagzoutiun. Iwould like to repeat that this document you will be reading is not a magazinearticle or a speech but a report submitted to the Dashnagzoutiun Conventionin Bucharest in 1923. The person who read this report, HovannesKatchaznouni may be considered the most important figure in the Dashnagmovement. He was holding a responsible position during the period 1915-1923 in which the events referred to as “the Armenian Genocide” took place.The present report is actually a summary of the events in that period.Who is Katchaznouni?Hovannes Katchaznouni is the first prime-minister of the Armenianstate founded in July 1918. He was in power as the head of governmentuntil August 1919, for thirteen months. He was among the founders of theDashnagzoutiun Party and one of its top leaders. He was the primeauthority of Armenia and the Dashnagzoutiun Party.6He was born in 1867 in the Akhaltsikhe (Ahıska) region ofGeorgia. Having studied architecture, he worked as an architect in Baku. Hejoined the Dashnag organization there. He became a member of theArmenian National Council in 1917 and was the Dashnag representative inthe Seym (the Caucasian Parliament) until 1918. He was on the Armeniancommittee, conducting the peace talks with the Turks in Trabzon andBatoum. After the dissolution of the Caucasian State, he became the firstprime-minister of the independent Armenian State in 1918. He held thisposition until August 1919. He was arrested after Bolsheviks came to powerin Armenia in 1920. He left the country after the counter-revolutionaryrevolt against the Bolshevik rule was suppressed in 1921. Years later, hereturned to the Soviet Armenia to work there as an architect until his deathin 1938.Publication of the ReportKatchaznouni voices a self-criticism of the past in this conferencereport. This self-criticism is actually a confession. Katchaznouni honestlyand sincerely resolves that the Dashnagzoutiun Party is responsible for thepast agonies. He concludes, at the end of the report, that theDashnagzoutiun Party should dissolve itself and leave the political arena. Hislast words are significant: “Yes, I propose suicide, the party should commitsuicide,” he says.Katchaznouni publishes his report very urgently, that same year. Thetitle he uses once more emphasizes his proposal of suicide: “DashnagzoutiunHas Nothing to do Anymore”Katchaznouni omitted some three or four pages concerning hisproposals about the inner organizational issues of the party when he firstpublished this report as a book. However, he included in the book a letter hewrote to a fellow party member who had criticized his report in his letter.The book published in Armenian was translated into Russian four yearslater and and an edition of only 2000 copies was published in Tbilisi in 19277as a significant warning or lesson. The Russian edition included anintroduction in Russian.4The English edition of the book was was published in 1955 with thetitle The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagsoution) HasNothing To Do Any More by the “Armenian Information Service” in NewYork. However, this was an abridged edition.What is interesting but what seems natural when the content of thebook is taken into consideration, is the fact that this historical report by thefirst Armenian prime minister was banned in Armenia. It is also a fact thatall the copies were collected from the libraries in Europe by Dashnags. Allthe copies in all the languages were collected from European libraries. Thebook is included in the catalogues but no copies can be found in the racks.I discovered a copy of the Russian edition in the Lenin Library inMoscow, during my research on the Armenian issue. The book was translatedinto Turkish by Arif Acaloğlu with utmost care and precision and I would liketo extend my thanks to him here for his worthy contribution.Studies in TurkeyIn the Introduction to the previous editions of this book we indicatedthat Prof. Türkkaya Ataöv had informed the reader about the bookKatchaznouni published, in his work in English, in 1985. However, there areearlier references to the book. 34 years before Prof. Ataöv’s book, EsatUras; again, a few years before Ataöv, Ambassador Kamuran Gürün and inthe same year, in 1985, Mim Kemal Öke referred to the book. This meansthat the book has been known in Turkey for over half a century.Esat Uras, in his celebrated work Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi(Armenians and the Armenian Question in History), which was published in1950, made references to Katchaznouni’s book.5 So it is clear that4 S. Hanoian, in the Introduction, states that Katchaznouni was “open-hearted” in his report, despite somecriticism concerning his ideas on the Soviet rule. However, in the Soviet Armenia, there were very graveciticisms on Katchaznouni’s book. See Marents, “Litso Arsyaskogo Smenohovstva”, BolşevikZakavakazya,No.3-4, 1928, s. 83 vd.5 Esat Uras, Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi, 1stanbul 1950, s. 716, 740 vd, 758.8Katchaznouni’s book, published in Armenian in 1923 in Vienna, hadbeen translated into Turkish before 1950, when Uras published his book.Quotations from the same manuscript translation were also made byAmbassador Kamuran Gürün in his work, Ermeni Dosyası (The ArmenianFile), published in 1983 by the Turkish History Institute6.The bibliography of the booklet, Dokuz Soru ve Cevapta ErmeniSorunu (The Armenian Question in Nine Questions and Answers), whichstates the “Foreign Politics Institute” as the publisher, contains a reference tothe 1923 edition published by Katchaznouni himself in Vienna.7 However, inthe bibliography the title of the book appears not in Armenian but in English.It seems that the publications of this institute were parallel to those of theTurkish State.Mim Kemal Öke, in his article in a collection published by BoğaziçiUniversity in 1984, quoted in length from the English abridged editionpublished in New York in 1955.8Prof. Türkkaya Ataöv published a ten-page work on Katchaznouni’sbook, in 1984, in English. This work was translated into French, German andSpanish and was published together in these four languages by thepropaganda bureaus of the Turkish State, in 1985. Ataöv, in this work, whichhas never been published in Turkish, states that he has got a typewrittencopy of the Turkish translation of Katchaznouni’s book in Armenian. It seemsthat the manuscript translation referred to by Esat Uras and Kamuran Gürünhad been reduplicated as a typewritten copy in the meanwhile. Otherresearchers might also have referred to the Turkish or English translations ofKatchaznouni’s report before 1984.6 Kamuran Gürün, Ermeni Dosyası, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 1983, s. 196, 234, 274, 304 vd,308.7 Dış Politika Enstitüsü, Dokuz Soru ve Cevapta Ermeni Sorunu, Ankara, Nisan 1983, s. 41.8 Prof. Dr. Türkkaya Ataöv, An Armenian Source: Hovhannes Katchaznouni; Une Source ArmenienneHovhannes Katchaznouni¸ Eine Armenische Quelle: Hovhannes Katchaznouni¸ Fuenta Armenia.Hovhannes Katchaznouni¸; Second Printing, Ankara March 1985.9The Turkish edition, translated from the Armenian original is kept inthe Turkish History Institute, though we are not certain whether the ForeignMinistry keeps a copy.It might be considered surprising that this report by Katchaznounihas not received due attention in Turkey, so far. However, it might also beconsidered natural, because Turkey and Turkish researchers have not beenable to build their theses on a strong basis; they have not taken the strongstand of anti-imperialist struggle and the righteousness of the Turkish War ofIndependence; and also because neither the academic circles nor the TurkishForeign Ministry has understood the importance of this report and therefore ithas not been given due consideration. The Katchaznouni report had notbeen published in Turkish before the Kaynak Yayınları edition and in fact,it has almost been hidden. It has not even been the subject of any seriousresearch or study so far. Doubtlessly, the tendency on the part of theTurkish researchers and authorities to keep a certain distance with theRussian and Armenian archives played an important part in this. They musthave regarded using Russian sources as showing an inclination towardsBolshevism. This is also another indication showing that the main concern inTurkey was to render the Turkish theses sympathetic to the Westernimperialists. This is the essential point.The Katchaznouni report was introduced to the Turkish reader by theweekly Aydınlık, in its issue of October 2, 2005. Aydınlık’s treatment ofthe subject mainly consisted of a broad summary and an evaluation of thereport.Katchaznouni’s ObservationsKatchaznouni particularly states that he has come to his conclusionsafter a grave thinking process. The conclusions he has reached are not theresult of superficiality or lack of will-power. He knows he will infuriatemany. He calls on the delegates of the Dashnagzoutiun Conference to listento him patiently, with no prejudice. As he is determining the boundaries ofhis report, he explains that he will examine the period extending from WorldWar I to the Lausanne Conference, dividing it into certain phases from the10point of view of the Armenian question and will focus on the roleDashnagzoutiun has played in this process.The first Prime Minister of the Dashnagzoutiun Government makes thefollowing observations:- It was a mistake to establish the volunteer units.- They were unconditionally allied with Russia.- They had not taken into consideration the balance of power whichwas in Turkey’s favour.- The decision of the deportation of Armenians was a rightfulmeasure taken by Turks to serve their purpose.- Turkey had acted with an instinct of self-defence.- The British occupation once more aroused the hopes of theDashnags.- What they established in Armenia was a Dashnag dictatorship.- They had acted in pursuit of the imperialist demand,”From Sea toSea” and had been provoked with this.- They massacred the Muslim population.- The Armenian terrorist acts were directed at winning over theWestern public opinion.- The fault was not to be found outside the Dashnagzoutiun Party.- The Dashnagzoutiun Party had nothing else to do but commitsuicide.Yes, all these observartions were made by Katchaznouni, the firstPrime Minister of Armenia and the founder of the Dashnagzoutiun Party.Katchaznouni considers the essence of the Turkish-Armenian relationsduring the period of 1914-23 as a state of war. According to Katchaznouni’sevaluations, this war was actually between Turkey and the great imperialistpowers. Katchaznouni does not make any evaluations that hold Turkeyresponsible, for he considers the Dashnags and their Armenian followers asone side of the war and Turkey as the other side. He concludes that in theface of Turkish victory, the Dashnagzoutiun Party has nothing else to do butdissolve itself.11These observations may surprise some people. However, weknow that many other Armenian statesmen and historians have also madethe same evaluations. The years following 1921 were years of deep selfcriticismfor Armenian intellectuals. They were finally face to face withrealities. Doubtlessly, the Bolshevik rule played an important part in this newturn to reality. The new stand taken against imperialism necessarilyreminded them of the realities and pulled them towards the Lenin-Atatürkalliance. For this reason, especially the Armenian and Dashnag documentsbelonging to the period following 1921 confirm Katchaznouni’s views. TheDashnag documents, some of which are found in the Armenian StateArchives expose the lie of “Armenian Genocide” as dramatically asKatchaznouni’s report. The Dashnag sources themselves disclose how theTsarist Russia and Western used them against Turkey imperialism; whatmassacres they were responsible for during the occupation and how just wasthe fight the Turkish army waged.Report Teaches a LessonKatchaznouni’s report is extremely valuable not only because itdiscloses an indisputable truth but also because it teaches invaluable lessonseven in the present day world. The present USA strategy bestows specialmissions on small ethnic and religious groups in dividing certain countries.The bloody outcomes of these missions are apparent in the examples ofYugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. What is more, the world public opinion isaware that new examples will ensue. However, there is always a final scenein these plots and contrivances. Katchaznouni’s report provides anopportunity to see the tragedies that fill those last scenes, with all theirsadness. Those who allowed themselves to be pushed against the peoplesthey had been living together with, for hundreds, even thousands of years,had not only their neighbors but also their own people pay the price for it,most gravely. Katchaznouni, like all the other Armenian writers state that theTsarist Russian regime, the British and the French imperialism used themand when, finally, they were left alone, they had nothing else to do butbemoan that they had been betrayed. Those who can interpret thedevelopments in history can certainly see that the regrets and the cries thatwill follow the present historical period will not be in a different tone.12Other Documents in the Dashnag Archives ConfirmKatchaznouniKatchaznouni’s observations stated in his report are confirmed byother documents in the Dashnag archives. These Dashnag documents, someof which can be found in the Armenian archives, expose the “Genocide” lie inthe same dramatic way seen in Katchaznouni’s report. The Dashnagdocuments themselves show how they were used by the Tsarist Russia andthe Western imperialism against Turkey and what massacres they wereresponsible for, during the occupation and how rightful was the fight theTurkish army waged against all this.Fight against Turkey in the Tsarist ArmiesThe imperialist centers accuse the Ottoman state and Mustafa Kemal’sRevolutionary government with subjecting the Armenians to massacre andgenocide during 1915-23. However, the eight years, which comprise theperiod of the Turkish War of Independence, are at the same time years offight for the Dashnag forces, under the leadership of the Tsarist regime ofRussia, the British, and the French armies. This historical fact has beenreflected in thousands of Armenian documents.I would like to give a few examples. The declaration sent by theArmenian National Bureau to Tsar Nicholas II at the very beginning of WorldWar I, shows how deeply attached the Dashnag leaders feel towardsimperialism:“As the glorious Russian Armies are fighting against Turkey who,with German support has dared to raise its hand against mightyRussia, on the lands in its own hegemony, in the snowy Armenianmountains and the vast Alashkert valley, the Armenians, taking theadvice of their forefathers (…) have risen to sacrifice their lives andtheir assets to Great Russia and the magnificence of its throne.“The good news of war with Turkey has aroused enthusiasmamong all the Armenian people. The Armenians from all the countriesare in haste to take their place in the glorious Russian armies and toserve the achievement of the Russian arms with their blood. We arepraying God to be victorious over the enemy. We owe it to our nation13to turn into new Russian arms and to fulfill Russia’s historical dutyin the East. Our hearts are burning with this desire.“The Russian flag will freely flutter in the Bosphorous and theDardanelles.Your will, my magnificent lord, bestow freedom to the peoplesunder Turkish yoke”.9Zaven, the Armenian Bishop in Istanbul had already declared, beforethe war started, to the reporter of Mşak, the organ of the Armeniannationalist-liberals, that the radical solution of the Armenian question wouldbe the unification of all Armenia (including the Eastern Anatolia of Turkey-M.P.) under Russian sovereignty with which Armenians’ fate was historicallylinked. The Bishop stated, “The sooner the Russians arrive here, the betterfor us.”10Zavriev, the Head of the International Relations Department of theDashnagzoutiun Party, in the letter he sent to the ambassadors of the TsaristRussia in London and Paris in 1915, exposes the role played by Armenians inWorld War I:“Since the first days of the present war, the Russian Armenianshave been in the expectation of joining the war. This situation givesrise to the hope that the Armenian question will be taken up at the endof the war, and it will definitely be solved. For this reason, Armenianscannot hold back from participating in the prospective events and thusmust take their place in the war, most passionately”11Another Dashnag document which supports the content of this letter inthe Tsarist Russian archives is in the personal archives of Borian, a politician,9 Mşak, No. 271, 1914: cited by ibid p. 8910 Armenian SSR State Central History Archives (TsGİA Arm. SSR) fond vıpisok, folder 37, sheet 45-46,cited in K.N. Karamyan, PolojenieZapadnıh Armyan, “ArmyanskiVopros” i Mejdunarodnaya DiplomatiyaV Posledney Çetverti XIX Veka İ Naçale XX Veka, Yerevanski Gosudarstvennıy Universitet, Yerevan,1972, p.87 vd.11 Mejdunarodnie Otnoşenia V Epohu İmperializma (Dokumenti İz Arhiva Tsarskogo İ VremennogoPravitelstva), seriya III, t. VII, ç.II, Gosudarstvennoe Sotsialno-Ekonomiçeskoe İzdatelsvo, Moskva-Leningrad, 1935, p. 4514and historian. The document, which comprises the speech made by themilitary representative of the Dashnagzoutiun Party in the All ArmeniaNational Congress convened in Tbilisi in February 1915, is significant:“As is known, the Russian government gave 242 900 rubles atthe beginning of the war to make preparations to arm the TurkishArmenians and to incite revolts in the country during the war. Ourvolunteer units need to break the defense line of the Turkish forcesand to unite with the rebels and to create anarchy on the front andbehind the lines and by these means help the Russian armies passthrough and capture Turkish Armenia”.12Dashnag publications are full of documents admitting that they createdanarchy on the front and behind the lines and fought as the striking force ofthe Russian armies. Orizon, the organ of Dashnagzoutiun reads as follows inits 196th issue of 1912:“The Turkish state authorities and those in power should knowthat from now on, neither a Turk nor the Turkish state has any valuefor an Armenian whatsoever. Let them think of other means to protecttheir existence.”1312 Prof.Dr. Türkkaya Ataöv, An Armenian Source: Hovannes Katchaznouni; Une Source Armenienne:Hovannes Katchaznouni; Fuenta Armenia: Hovannes Katchaznouni: Second Printing. Ankara, March199512 Mşak, No. 271, 1914: cited by ibid p. 8912 Armenian SSR State Central History Archives (TsGİA Arm. SSR) fond vıpisok, folder 37, sheet 45-46,cited in K.N. Karamyan, PolojenieZapadnıh Armyan, “ArmyanskiVopros” i Mejdunarodnaya DiplomatiyaV Posledney Çetverti XIX Veka İ Naçale XX Veka, Yerevanski Gosudarstvennıy Universitet, Yerevan,1972, p.87 vd.12 Mejdunarodnie Otnoşenia V Epohu İmperializma (Dokumenti İz Arhiva Tsarskogo İ VremennogoPravitelstva), seriya III, t. VII, ç.II, Gosudarstvennoe Sotsialno-Ekonomiçeskoe İzdatelsvo, Moskva-Leningrad, 1935, p. 4512 See B.A. Borian, Armeniya, Mejdunarodnaya Diplomatiya i SSSR, v.IGosudarstvennoe İzdatelstvo, Moskva-Leningrad, 1929, p. 36013 Prof.Dr. Türkkaya Ataöv, An Armenian Source: Hovannes Katchaznouni; Une Source Armenienne:Hovannes Katchaznouni; Fuenta Armenia: Hovannes Katchaznouni: Second Printing. Ankara, March199513 Mşak, No. 271, 1914: cited by ibid p. 8913 Armenian SSR State Central History Archives (TsGİA Arm. SSR) fond vıpisok, folder 37, sheet 45-46,cited in K.N. Karamyan, PolojenieZapadnıh Armyan, “ArmyanskiVopros” i Mejdunarodnaya DiplomatiyaV Posledney Çetverti XIX Veka İ Naçale XX Veka, Yerevanski Gosudarstvennıy Universitet, Yerevan,1972, p.87 vd.13 Mejdunarodnie Otnoşenia V Epohu İmperializma (Dokumenti İz Arhiva Tsarskogo İ VremennogoPravitelstva), seriya III, t. VII, ç.II, Gosudarstvennoe Sotsialno-Ekonomiçeskoe İzdatelsvo, Moskva-Leningrad, 1935, p. 4513 See B.A. Borian, Armeniya, Mejdunarodnaya Diplomatiya i SSSR, v.I15Again in the 243rd issue of October 31, 1914 of Orizon, it is claimedthat the victory of the Tsarist Russia will also be the victory of Armenianswhile Armenians are called to actively participate in the war,.14Another organ of the Dashnags, Ayrenik, on September 24, 1914,states the following, concerning Nikolai Nikolaievich, the Caucasian Governorof Tsarist Russia, who has just arrived in Tbilisi:“Yesterday His Excellency the Royal Prince Nikolai Nikolaievich,the deputy of the Tsar in Caucasia arrived in Tbilisi. We trust that theRoyal Prince will put an end to the existence of the Turkish Stateforever. With this conviction, we salute the dear 6th Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army in Caucasia and welcome him”.15In the dinner party following the march of the volunteer unit,commanded by Vardan, on April 15, 1915, in Echmiadzin, the first toast wasproposed to glorious Russia and its heroic army. All Armenian……,(catholic),after having sung ceremonial prayers, declared the gratitude of the Armenianpeople to the Russian armies and their readiness to emancipate theArmenian lands from the hegemony of foreigners, together with Russia.16Similarly, George V, the all Armenian …. catholic), after the occupationof Van, states in the congratulatory telegrams he sent to Vorontsov, theCaucasian Governor of Russia and to P.I. Oganovsky, the Commander of the4th Caucasian Army that he is praying for new victories of the Russianarmies17Gosudarstvennoe İzdatelstvo, Moskva-Leningrad, 1929, p. 36013 Orizon, No. 196, 1912 cited inK.N.Karamyan op.cit. p. 8114 Orizon, No. 243, October 31, 1914, cited in A.M. Elchibekian, Armenya Nakanune Velikogo Oktyabrya,İzdatelstvo AN Armyanskoy SSR, Yerevan, 1963, p. 1815 Ayrenik, No. 2, Sept.24 1915 cited in Lalaian, “Kontrrevolyutsionnıy ‘Dahnagsutyun’ İİmperialistiçeskaya Voyna 1914-1918 gg”, Revolyutsionnıy Vostok, No.2-3, 1936, p. 9116 Ararat No. 5, 1915, p.288 vd cited in: A.O.Arutiunian, Kavkazski Front 1914-1917 gg., İzdatelstvo“Ayastan”, Yerevan, 1971, p.30517 Ararat No. 5, 1915, s. 415 vd cited in: ibid, p.30716Hatisian, one of the important leaders of Dashnagzoutiun, in hismemoirs published in the 5th issue of Ayrenik in 1933, states that “with thedefeat of the Russian army, all our hopes pinned on this army wereexhausted”18 and declares his position in World War I.Fighting Against Turkey in the service of the British and FrenchArmiesFollowing the collapse of the Tsarist Russia, Dashnags went under thecontrol of the Western imperialists and fought against Turkey for theregional interests of Britain, France, and USA.Katchaznouni, as the Prime Minister of the Dashnag government, onFebruary 1919 , in a meeting with General F. Wocker, the commander of theoccupational British forces, stated that he was sure the conditions ofArmenians would improve with the victories of the Allies and with theirmovement into Caucasia. The report on this meeting is in the archives of theInterior Ministry of Armenia.19Similarly, another document in the Armenian State Archives relatesthat the Armenians in Adana were armed by the French occupational forcesunder the command of General Diffe, and were organized in ”revenge units”and fought in French uniforms.20Obeying British and French imperialism resulted in acommitment in Greek invasion. The Foreign Minister of the DashnagGovernment states, in the telegram he sent to his representative in Tbilisi:18 Ayrenik, No. 5, 1933, cited in: a.A. Lalaian, “Kontrevolyutsionnaya Rol Partii Dashnagsoutiun”,İstoriçeskie Zapiski, No.2, 1928, p.8319 See Armenian SSR Interior Ministery Central October Revolution Archives (TsAOR MVD SSRA)f.114,d. 23, y.48 cited in: D. Yenukidze, Krah İmperialistiçeskoy İnterventsii V Zakavkazye, GospolizdatGruzinskoy SSR, Tbilisi, 1954, p. 18820 Armenian SSR State History Archives (GİA Arm. SSR) f. 200 d. 132. y. 338 cited in:N.Z.Efendiyeva, Borba Turetskogo Naroda Protiv Frantsuzkih Okkupantov Na Yege Anatolii (1919-1921)gg.)İzdatelsvo AN Azerbaycanskoy SSR, Baku, 1966, p. 11617“The situation on the front is very grave. It is essentialthat you see Luck and Corbeille21 and have them send telegrams totheir governments informing them of how the Turkish troops areadvancing and demand that they take all the necessary precautions(…)See the Greek representative too and demand that he too send atelegram to his government to inform them of the situation and to askthem if it is possible for the Greek forces to start an assault and breakthe strength of the Turkish forces”22Armenian Cruelty in Dashnag ReportsThe Armenian documents are also full of stories of massacre bythe Dashnags under the command of the Tsarist Russia and WesternImperialism.In the letter of directive sent by Nikolaev, the commander of theVan military units, to Aram, who became the Governor of Van following theoccupation of the city, on June 22, 1915, the troops are ordered to attack theKurdish population in the area and ransack the villages. However, Aram, inhis protesting reply states that the directives will not be carried out but as awarning to the Muslims in the areas not yet occupied, the guilty will bepunished most gravely.23On the other hand, in the urgent report dated November 7,1918 sent by Lieutenant Colonel Melik-Shahnazarov, the commander of theDashnag Bash-Gyarninsk unit, he informs another Armenian division thatthey have bombed all the villages in the area, captured 30 Turkish villagesand that they demand permission for an operation to bomb the remaining 29villages. This Dashnag unit, which gets the permission from the Headquarterslays waste tens of Azerbaijanis villages in the Bash-Gyarninsk region, killshundreds of people young and old, consisting of men, women and childrenand ransacks their belongings. The report by the Dashnag Lieutenant Colonelis kept in the Armenian State Archives.2421 The representatives of the Allies in Tbilisi22 D.S. Zavriev, K. Noveyşey, İstorii Severo-Vostoçnıh Vilayetov Turtsii, Tbilisi, 1947, s. 8523 D.S. Zavriev, K.Noveisheyİstorii Severo- Vostochnıh Vilayetov Turtsii, Tbilisi, 1947, p. 8524 Armenian State Archives (Gosarhiv Armenii) f. 67, d. 664, y. 1-2 cited in A.A. Lalaian, op.cit p. 99 vd.18The Dashnag report published by the Armenian Soviethistorian Lalaian first in the issue 2-3 of the magazine, RevolyutsionnıyVostok and then in issue 2 of İstoricheskie Zapisky, the organ of the USSRAcademy of Sciences, Institute of History, is horrifying. The Dashnag officer,in the report he wrote from the Beyazıt-Vaaram region in 1920, narratesproudly their practices in the area:“I exterminated the Turkish population in Bashar-Gechar withoutmaking any exceptions. One sometimes feels the bullets shouldn’t bewasted. So, the most effective way against these dogs is to collect thepeople who have survived the clashes, dump them in deep holes, andcrush them under heavy rocks pressed from above, not to let theminhabit this world any longer. So I did accordingly. I collected all thewomen, men and children and extinguished their lives in the deepholes I dumped them into, crushing them with rocks.”25Dashnag Policy of PlunderThe Dashnag units practiced methods of torture of the Middle Agesand plundered the villages. In this way, they tried to overcome the financialcrisis that the Armenian State was in. In the letter written by a Dashnagofficial to the head of the Dashnag government, A. Oganjanian, dated June21, 1920, the official complains that the wealth that should be handed overto the Armenian state is being plundered by Armenians:“Zanki-Basar was occupied by our troops. This country is so richthat it can pay our debts many times over. There has been anunconceivable plunder here. They have collected all the wheat, thebarley, the rice, all the samovars, the carpets, all the money, andgold. The Ministry of Finance could only send here yesterday, twoofficials, not accompanied by an organized force. A wealth of giganticproportions is sliding away from our hands.”2625 Op.cit p. 101; A. Lalaian, “Kontrevolyuysionnıy ‘Dashnagsutiun’ İ İmperialisticheskaia Voyna 1914-1918 gg.”, p. 92 vd26 Gosarhiv Armenii f. 65, d. 116, y. 96 cited in: A.A. Lalaian, “ Kontrevolyutsionnaya Rol PartiiDashnagzoutiun”, p. 100.19This report by the Dashnag official who wanted the propertybelonging to Turks should be collected in the hands of the government is inthe Armenian State Archives. Another important document in this direction isthe report sent by the Armenian Governor of Kars, to the central authority.The Governor, as he is reporting how the Turkish-Kurdish population isexterminated and their assets plundered, complains that they are not alwayssuccessful in collecting all the wealth in their hands in the occupied villages.The Governor adds that “the region comprising Turks and Kurds is really likea treasure. But unfortunately we cannot fully control this place.”27We come across the evidence of another instance of plunder in the105th issue of 1920 of daily Jogovurd. The writer named G. Muradianrecounts from the Azerbaijani villages of the North bank of Lake Gorchy hisimpressions of the Dashnag policy of plunder, with admiration:“As a result of the work carried out by our government, thepopulation of these villages has been expelled outside the borders ofArmenia. I have seen abandoned villages with only a few cats anddogs that were meowing or barking strangely with surprise at thedeath silence. The population of these villages has left behind aconsiderable amount of potatoes, wheat and barley and seeds. Thegovernment can collect from these villages, over two million pods ofwheat and half a million pod of potatoes.”28Dashnag Torture on Armenian PeasantsDashnag documents also document how Armenian peasants sufferedunder the unbelievable torture and cruelty of the Armenian governmentitself. For example, it was reflected in the documents how the DashnagGovernment Commissar, V. Agamian punished people and had them shotwithout trying them or carrying out an investigation on them, in order toprevent escapes from the army. Agamian gathered the wives, mothers andsisters of the people charged with deserting the army and stripped them27 Gosarhiv Armenii f. 67, d. 1769, y. 25, cited in: ibid28 Jogovur, No. 105, 1920 cited in op.cit p. 100 vd20naked and forced them to duck-walk in the village square. The Dashnagofficial then beat the naked women and kept them in water for hours.Agamian, who later ordered the women to be arrested, raped the younggirls and women during the night. Agamian stayed in office for a long timewithout ever been punished. The Dashnag government called him back, onlywhen they learned from a peasant named M. Azaparetov that the peasantswere going to attempt at assassinating Agamian.29A one-time member of the Dashnag government, Jagetian, in hisarticle published in Iran, makes the following statements concerning theDashnag rule, which he was a part of:“The government armies, the pseudo-volunteer units (humbas),plundered the villages around the town of Ichevan (old Delican) andraped the women. The volunteer execution team put the peasants insuch a state that the ‘humbapeta’ (the head of the team), ‘Arch-Mard’ (the bear-man) surrounded the village with 50 volunteers andpulled it down. Almost one thousand Armenian peasants werepushed to Azerbaijan territory.”Jagetian says that no official was punished for special treatment offriends and relatives and adds:“The Armenian Interior Ministry had become the shelter for allthe criminals. The Minister Krmonian himself embezzled 50 millionrubles from the state treasury one day before he left office.”30. Years later, another representative of the Dashnags, the publisherChalhushian calls the government police “plunder troops” and tells how itbecame impossible to walk unarmed in the center of the Armenian capitalafter sunset.3129 See A. Karinian, “K. Harakteristike Armyianskih Nationalisticheskih Techeniy”, bolshevik Zakavkatzia,No. 9-10, 1928, p. 7030 See A Karinian, “K Harakteristike Armianskih Nationalisticheskih Techeniy”, Bolshevik Zakavkazia, No.9-10, 1928. p. 7031 See İbid p. 70 vd.21In fact, the system of Armenian volunteer units called“humbapeta” systemized anarchy and plunder in Armenia and theneighboring countries. The following song sung all together is actually amusical confession so far as it reflects the psychology of the volunteer units:“Come, pull down, pillage, kill and lay your jacket on your shoulder, walkabout freely!”32These circumstances gave rise to a situation where everyone who sowished founded a volunteer unit and turned these units into criminalorganizations. The directive given out by the “humbapeta” (head of the unit)named Deli-Qazar expresses this situation very well:“Announcement to the Armenians of the Yerevan region and thetown of Yerevan: I am going to the front today with the boys. If somepeople, after I have left, introduce themselves as Deli-Qazar’s boysand misuse my name as a blackmailer, they will be punished severelyby the nation and the military authority.”33By 1918, The Dashnag Government had recruited all its citizens below35 to the army and had reestablished “volunteer” units for the war to befought against Turkey. In their publications, they made announcementsthreatening those who would go against this decision with death andproclaimed that “those who were wise” would not act against them. The issuedated March 1, 1918 of the Dashnag organ, Arev contains such information.34In another document kept in the Armenian State Archives it is stated thatspecial troops have been dispatched to punish the villages of Berd, Verhniy,Karmir, Ahbyur and the Shamshadinsk region.35The Dashnag organ, Martik, published in Guru states that twocannons, one machine gun and a team of soldiers will be dispatched to thevillages of those who have not participated in the military mobilization and32 T. Hachikoglian, 10 Let Armyanskoy Strelkovoy Divizii, İzdatelstvo Polit. Uprav. KKA, Tiflis, 1930, p. 533 İbid, p.5 vd.34 Arev, No. 46, March 1, 1918 cited in: A. Lalaian, “Kontrrevolyutsiyonnıy ‘Dashnagsutyutiun’ İİmperialistcheskaia Voina 1914-1918 gg.”, p. 96.35 Armenian SSR Central State Archive (TsGA Arm. SSR) f. 67/199, d. 139, y. 230 cited in:A.M.Elchibekian, Ustanovlenie Sovyetskoy Vlasti V. Armenii, İzdatelstvo AN Armyanskoy SSR, Yerevan,1954, p. 7622that those who resist will be bombarded.36 The Dashnag authorityhad even formed troops named “Terror Organ” in order to fight thedeserters and posted such announcements on the village walls:“To all the deserters and the Armenian people: On the night ofMarch 1, somebody stealing a horse and two others deserting theregiment betrayed our country and the Armenian people and thethree Armenian soldiers were executed by shooting. All the desertersshould report to their troops and do their military service before itis too late. Otherwise they will be punished in the same way. Deathto the traitors who will give Turks the opportunity of raiding Shiraq(Şirak). Terror Organ. Guru, March 2, 1918” 37Jogavurd, one of the organs of the Armenian ruling powers states in itsissue of June 29, 1920 that the Dashnag Government blocked the flow of theriver Zhangi (Zangi) and cut their water supplies to punish the resistingpeasants in the region. As a result of this punishment many people died andthe crops were ruined.38Mauses Petros, one of the Dashnag ex-Foreign Ministers, who, likeKatchaznouni, makes an appraisal of the past period in an open letter hewrote to Simeon Vratsian, one of the Dashnag ex-Prime Ministers and saysthat the past adventurous attitude of the government has brought povertyand national conflicts to the country. Petros’ open letter was published inZang, the organ of the Hınchaq Party in Tabriz, on September 21, 1921.39Armenian Peasants Enthusiastically Greeting Turkish ArmyThe Dashnags acting violently against the Turks and Kurds andmassacring them caused antipathy also among the Armenian people.Moreover, some Armenian documents show the warm feelings displayed byArmenian peasants towards the Turkish Army. The report written by an36 Martik, No. 2, 1918 cited in: T.P. Agaian, Veliki Oktyahr i Borba Trudyashihsia Armenii Za PobeduSovyekskoy Vlasti, İzdatelstvo AN Aramianskoy SSR, Yerevan, 1962, p. 13437 T. Hachikoglian, op.cit., p. 738 Jogovurd, No.102, June 1920 cited in: A.A. Lalaian, “Kontrevolyutsionnaya Rol Partii Dashnagsutiun”,p. 10239 See Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPİ) f. 64, I. 1, d. 208, y. 167-171.23Armenian officer sent from the town of Echimiadzin (Eçimiadzin) to thevillages of Guru, in search of the Armenian soldiers who had deserted thearmy is striking. The commander, on the information he received from thereport, reports to the Headquarters, on October 14, 1920, that:“The Armenians in the Guru region showed a hostile attitude towardsthe Dashnag officer and even attempted to turn him in to the Turks afew times. The people in many villages seem averse and hostiletowards the military. In the villages of Ilhiab and Kapanak red flagshave been put up. (…) My officer has come across a Turkish cavalryguard accompanied by horsemen from the Selchan (Selçan)Armenians. The Turks were welcomed with bread and salt. Peasantwomen cooked dishes in cauldrons. When my officer asked them whothey were cooking the dishes for, they answered: “Certainly not foryou, they are for the Turks.” “40The reception by the Armenian people themselves, of the TurkishArmy, accused of genocide today, in this warm manner, gives an idea abouthow authentic the accusation is.It is interesting that Dashnags themselves advocated a pro-Turkishstand when the Soviet rule was established in Armenia, to be able tomaintain their existence. Dashnags, who had displayed hostility towardscommunism for a long time and had suppressed the progressive peopleamong Armenians, fighting against imperialism now started to defendalliance with Turkey as a way out. This fact too disproves the claims thatTurkey practiced genocide on Armenians. In the article published in theDashnag newspaper, Arach (Araç), on October 20, 1920, titled “The Questionof Armistice and Our Direction”, it is stated that “if the Armenian people wishto maintain their existence, they are to adopt an inclination towards Turkey,not Russia”.4140 TsGA Arm. SSR f. 68/200, d. 867, y. 278 cited in: A.M. Elchibekian, Velikaya OkyabrskyaSotsialistiçeskaya Revolyutsiya İ Pobeda Sovyetskoy Vlasti V Armenii, İzdatestvo A N Armyanskoy SSR,Yerevan, 1957, p. 20941 Arach, No. 255 October 20, 1920 cited in: A.A. Lalaian, op.cit. p. 105 and T.P. Agaian, op.cit. p.3124This preference is explained also in Ayrenik,42 the organ of theArmenians in the USA. Here, they even speak about how they caused warsby making too many demands on the Ottoman authorities in both theAbdulhamid and the Itched Terakki periods and how the Armenians areresponsible for the killings.”43The Invaluable Katchaznouni Report and other ArmenianDocumentsThere have been endless allusions to “documents” in the discussionsconcerning the facts of World War I, from the point of view of Turkish-Armenian relations. It is as if everybody is in search of a “magic document”to prove or disprove the “Armenian Genocide”. It is quite absurd to attemptat proving or disproving a historical fact such as genocide with one or twodocuments. However, if the public opinion and the academia are in need ofvaluable documents, the Katchaznouni Report is matchless in this respect, forthe author is the first prime minister of Armenia; not of Turkey. And heencountered the incidents termed as genocide when he was the primeauthority in the Dashnagzoutiun Party and the Armenian Government.He evaluated the events calmly and conscientiously not during butafter the war, after it was over.The person who wrote the report was the leader of one of the partiesat war, in fact, of the party, which is claimed to have suffered genocide.The Prime-Minister of Armenians, who are claimed to have sufferedgenocide, evaluates the incidents as events of war and what is more,sincerely admits that they have been manipulated by the imperialists.The document in your hands is not in the Turkish archives butin the Russian and Armenian archives. Who should the imperialists trust ifthey do not trust the Armenian Prime Minister, when they are making anappraisal of the claims about the “Armenian Genocide”? If the Armenianarchives do not persuade them, which other archive will?42 A. Myasnikov, Armyanskie Politiçeskie Partii Za Rubejom, İzdatelstvo “Sovyetski Kavkaz”, Tiflis, 1925,p. 19.43 T.P. Agaian, op.cit. p. 3125The Katchaznouni Report puts an end to the great imperialist lie of“Armenian Genocide”.What remains is to launch a world-wide campaign of publishing theKatchaznouni Report and other Armenian documents which expose the factsin Turkish, English, French, German, Armenian, Russian, Arabic, Chinese,Spanish and other languages.Here are the facts from the pen of Katchaznouni, the first ArmenianPrime-Minister, and leader of the Dashnagzoutiun Party.It will be appropriate to send a copy of this report to the Committee ofInternational Relations of the US House of Representatives, to theparliaments of various USA states, the French National Assembly, theGerman Federal Parliament, to the Swedish National Parliament etc. They willlearn from the Armenian Prime-Minister the authenticity of the decisions of“Armenian Genocide” taken by their parliaments.Mehmet PerinçekOctober 11, 2005 Generala Tyuleneva/ MoscowTRANSLATOR’S NOTE TO THE PRESENT EDITIONThe report you are holding in your hands was delivered to theDashnatziun Congress convened in Bucharest, in April 1923 by HovhannesKatchaznouni, the first prime-minister of the Armenian Republic founded in1918.The original report was naturally delivered in Armenian and waspublished in Armenian by the author himself. It was translated to Russianand published in Tiflis (Tbilisi), four years later, in 1927 under Soviet rule,with a rather critical introductory note attached to it. The English translation,an abridged edition, was published in 1955 by the “Armenian InformationService” in New York.What is remarkable is that this very interesting historical documentshedding light over a controversial period of history written by a person whoplayed a crucial role in the life of Armenia has not been included among the26documents flying about in the air in relation to the Armenian question.Its copies were removed from the libraries in Europe by the Dashnagziunmembers. A Russian copy in the Lenin Library in Moskow has very recentlybeen translated into Turkish. This Turkish translation was compared with the1955 abridged English edition and the parts left out in the English editionwere supplemented from the Turkish 2005 edition and translated into Englishin order to arrive at the present English translation.When I was suggested translating the omitted sections of the reportinto English so that it would be published as an unabridged edition, I, likemost of my fellow citizens, was feeling amazed and frustrated at the turn theevents were taking; amazed because of the immense and increasingpressure turning into an open threat by the “Western powers”, ie, the EU andthe USA concerning how “Turkey, as the successor of the Ottoman Empireshould admit responsibility on the ‘Armenian genocide’”; and frustratedbecause nobody has been willing to listen to what Turkey has to say and alsobecause the present Turkish government has been apologetic andcompromising in the face of these pressures. With these sentiments, Ireadily accepted the offer, and now I am glad that with this book, certainhistorical facts which have been pushed consciously aside by the powers thatprovoked an ethnic minority to rise against their own state almost a centuryago when it was being pulled apart by the the same imperialist wolves of theworld, will be coming into the open through the mouth of a person who wasone of the leaders of the provoked people.I believe that whether what happened in 1914-1923 was “genocide” orself defense of an empire which was being pulled apart is not what reallyinterests the “Western powers” . It is the effect that this propaganda willproduce on the world and Turkish public opinion that will open the way toincreasing their control over Turkey, ie, over the Middle-East, the oil, gas andtrade routes is what interests them. Unfortunately the western public opinionis under this influence because the propanganda is very powerful, for it isalso backed up with financial power. This book, the first among a serieswhich will supply historical evidence in Western languages, will be of help forthose who are willing to find out what really happened.The two main allegations upon which Taner Akçam44 and others whoclaim that the Ittihat Terakki Party and mainly the head of government of thetime, Talat Paşa was guilty of “genocide” base their claims is that the IttihatTerakki Party, under the influence of a nationalistic urge, was actually tryingto “purge” Anatolia of non-Turkish ethnicities and that Talat Paşa actuallysecretly gave the order to massacre Armenians as an ethnic group. This bookwill be an answer to the first allegation:” In the Fall of 1914 Armenianvolunteer bands organized themselves and fought against the Turks becausethey could not refrain themselves from organizing and refrain themselvesfrom fighting. This was an inevitable result of a psychology on which theArmenian people had nourished itself during an entire generation” saysKatchaznouni and adds: “The Winter of 1914 and the Spring of 1915 werethe periods of greatest enthusiasm and hope for all the Armenians in theCaucasus, including, of course, the Dashnagtzoutiun. We had no doubt thatthe war would end with the complete victory of the Allies; Turkey would be44 See “Soykırım Suçunda Kasıt Unsuru Konusunda Bazı Notlar”, Birikim, sayı 19927defeated and dismembered, and its Armenian population would at last beliberated.We had embraced Russia whole-heartedly without anycompunction. Without any positive basis of fact we believed that the Tzaristgovernment would grant us a more-or-less broad self-government in theCaucasus and in the Armenian vilayets liberated from Turkey as a reward forour loyalty, our efforts and assistance”.Here I cannot help but quote another Armenian source quoted byMehmet Perinçek in his Foreword to the Turkish edition:“As the glorious Russian Armies are fighting against Turkey who,with German support has dared to raise its hand against mighty Russia, onthe lands in its own hegemony, in the snowy Armenian mountains and thevast Alashkert valley, the Armenians, taking the advice of their forefathers(…) have risen to sacrifice their lives and their assets to Great Russia and themagnificence of its throne.”45Katchaznouni evaluates the incidents of 1914-15 thus: “Thedeportations and mass exiles and massacres which took place during theSummer and Autumn of 1915 were mortal blows to the Armenian Cause.Half of historical Armenia -“ the same half where the foundations of ourindependence would be laid according to the traditions inherited by Europeandiplomacy -“ that half was denuded of Armenians: the Armenian provinces ofTurkey were without Armenians. The Turks knew what they were doing andhave no reason to regret today. It was the most decisive method ofextirpating the Armenian Question from Turkey”Is this an example of Genocide which means ‘a racial exterminationbased on no other reason but being a member of one race and not another’or a self-defence?It should not be forgotten that while the Armenian bands, most ofwhom were Ottoman citizens were fighting the Ottoman State, the sameState was fighting the British and the Greek on the Western front. Thebloody Gallipoli Battles were fought in March-September 1915 against themulti national armies from the British colonies under the leadership of theBritish themselves. Was the Ottoman government, among all these bloodybattles, suddenly seized by a racial fever and decided to exterminate theArmenians, or was the Empire fighting for survival on the eastern andwestern fronts?This is what Katchaznouni has to say for a few years later whenTurkey was still figting on several fronts: “The Armenian-Turkish war whichbroke our back began in the Fall of 1920. Would it have been possible toevade it? Probably not. The crushed Turkey of 1918 had recovered during thetwo years. There came forward patriotic, young officers who formed anew army in Asia Minor. They saw the necessity of attacking in the45 Mşak, No.271, 1914 cited in Prof. Dr Türkkaya Ataöv, An Armenian Source: Hovhannes Katchaznouni,Second Printing, Ankara, March 1995, cited in M.Perinçek, Taşnak Partisinin Yapacağı Bir şeyYok,Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p. 1128Northeast, and also in the Southwest against the Greeks which they couldnot do without first crushing their flank on the Armenian front. One cannotsay that the Turks really had such a plan, but it is possible that they did andit was also probable that the war with us was inevitable.”Once more I would like to quote another source, again quoted byMehmet Perinçek: The Foreign Minister of the Dashnagzoutiun Governmentsays, in 19 in a telegram sent to the representative in Tiflis (Tbilisi):“The situation on the front is very grave. It is essential to see Luckand Corbeille and have them send telegrams to their governments informingthem of how the Turkish troops are advancing and demand that they take allthe necessary precautions(…) See the Greek representative too and demandthat he too send a telegram to his government to inform them of thesituation and to ask them if it is possible for the Greek forces to start anassault and break the strength of the Turkish forces”46At this point I feel I have to stop and let Katchaznouni speak.INTRODUCTIONHowever the propagandist may try, historical truth cannot besubverted forever in a free country. However hard Dashnagpropagandists may try to twist and bury the truth, and glorify thefailure of their Independent Armenian Republic, truth musteventually prevail. Now, for the first time in English, is a deep andincisive self-study by a competent Dashnag observer.The author was a pillar of Dashnagtzoutiun. He was the first primeminister of the Republic. He knew every Party secret before, duringand after the founding of the ill-fated Republic. Few were in aposition to know more, nor to express themselves with greaterclarity, logic and foresight than Hovhannes Katchaznouni.Unlike most Dashnag leaders who were revolutionists, and reared inthe early Russian socialist-revolutionary schools, Katchaznouni wasborn in Akhaltzkha in the Caucasus, the son of a revered Armenianpriest. He was graduated from the Architectural School of theUniversity of Moscow. His notable works include the magnificentCathedral at Baku, among many others.This booklet is a condensation of his parting words47 toDashnagtzoutiun, given in the form of an address to the Partycongress in 1923 - words which proved remarkably prophetic, andcurrently are as true as when they were first spoken.46 D.S. Zavriev, K. Noveyşey, İstorii Severo-Vostoçnıh Vilayetov Turtsii, Tbilisi, 1947, s. 85. cited inM.Perinçek, Taşnak Partisinin Yapacağı Bir şey Yok,Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005,p.1647 As it is explained in the “Translator’s Note” to the 2006 edition that you are reading now, the missingparts of this condensed booklet are supplied from the edition in Turkish which was translated from theArmenian original.29In reprinting Katchaznouni’s address neither the translator nor theeditor are assumed to agree or disagree with his views.Katchaznouni’s work is published at this time as a refutation to thegrandiose, exaggerated and even outrageously false claims of theDashnag leadership today, mouthed by men who for the most partwere mere party functionaries during the days of the Republic, butthrough the years have blown up themselves into intellectualgiants, saviors of Armenia, etc.Katchaznouni’s work is a basic source of Dashnag history, and theArmenian Information Service considers it a privilege to be able topresent, for the first time, the writings of this Armenian patriot andprophet to an American audience.JOHN ROY CARLSONAugust, 1955 (Arthur A. Derounian)TO THE READERThis is a manifesto which I am preparing to the Convention offoreign branches of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation convenedduring this month of April, 1923.Deeply convinced that all the questions raised here will be subjectedto the most serious consideration of not only the members of theParty but also of every single Armenian, I thought it was my duty tohave this manifesto published and thereby make it public property.I am having it printed complete and without any alterations exceptthe final three or four pages which contain concrete proposals thatare reserved to the governing bodies of the Party.HOVHANNES KATCHAZNOUNIBucharest, July, 1923Comrades:These matters have had my deliberate and serious consideration. I donot know whether you, too, have arrived at the same conclusions. Allow meto say more: I am afraid that my final conclusion - those very difficult wordswhich I shall here state with all singleness of heart - will cause generalembarrassment, perhaps resentment, in the Convention.I am prepared for that.30I only ask that you believe: a) that it is more difficult for me towrite and sign those words than for you to listen to them from my own lips;b) that those words are not the result of thoughtless or petty, transientdispositions or hasty resolve.They are the result of deep-rooted convictionsand a clear awareness, for I am capable of thinking and understanding,considering and determining a stand point.I beg of you, therefore, that you be patient and approach the matterswith an open mind, unhampered - something which is not easy for men whohave lived a Party life and have thought from a Party angle.Let me now proceed with my subject.In order to present my conclusions in proper sequence I feel it isnecessary for me to refresh your memory with the various phases of theArmenian Cause -“ from the Great War to the Lausanne Conference48- andthe role played by the Dashnagtzoutiun during that period. So that I maynot abuse your attention, I shall curtail my speech and present to you aconcise yet accurate commentary.Following 1914, what stages did the Armenian question pass through,what development did the events show, how did they come about, whatsequence did they follow and and where did they lead to and in themeantime, what did our party do and what will it have to do in the future?When I recall the recent past, with these considerations in mind, andwhen I distinguish the important points from the secondary and the arbitraryones, and arrange them in chronological order, this is the picture thatarises:At the beginning of the Fall of 1914 when Turkey had not yet enteredthe war but had already been making preparations, Armenian revolutionarybands began to be formed in Transcaucasia with great enthusiasm and,especially, with much uproar. Contrary to the decision taken during theirgeneral meeting at Erzurum only a few weeks before, the A.R.F. had activeparticipation in the formation of the bands and their future military actionagainst Turkey.In an undertaking of such gravity, fraught with most seriousconsequences, individual agents of the Transcaucasian A.R.F. acted againstthe will of our superior authority, against the will of the General Meeting ofthe Party.Why?Because they were also suffering from the syndrome of following themasses, and were flowing in the direction that the current was taking them.This example urges us to recall that the A.R.F. in Transcaucasia in thepast had been a follower rather than an originator of movements that had48 In the Treaty of Lausanne, signed July 21, 1923 between the Allies and Turkey, reference was no longermade to Armenia or Armenians. Both had ceased to exist in the eyes of both Turkey and the Allies. Thusthe “Armenian Question” and the question of the Armenians were buried in the grave of diplomatic silence.31their inception beyond their control. Thus it was in 1903 (rebellions anddemonstrations on the occasion of the seizure of Church properties); thus itwas in the year 1905-1906 (bloody encounters between Tatars andArmenians); and thus it was also during the first big movements of thelaboring classes (1903-1906) when the A.R.F. was being led at Baku,Tiflis(Tblisi) and Batoum by the policies of foreign socialistic parties.The same characteristic line of action appears, as we see a little later,in the conduct we pursued afterwards generally.It would be useless to argue today whether our bands of volunteersshould have entered the field or not. Historical events have their irrefutablelogic. In the Fall of 1914 Armenian volunteer bands organized themselvesand fought against the Turks because they could not refrain themselvesfrom organizing and refrain themselves from fighting. This was an inevitableresult of a psychology on which the Armenian people had nourished itselfduring an entire generation: that mentality should have found itsexpression, and did so.And it was not the A.R.F. that would stop the movement even if itwished to do so. It was able to utilize the existing conditions, give effectand issue to the accumulated desires, hopes and frenzy, organize the readyforces - it had that much ability and authority. But to go against the currentand push forward its own plan - it was unfit, especially unfit for oneparticular reason: the A.R.F. is a people’s mass, strong in instinct but weakin comprehension.It is also useless, today, to question who is responsible for the wrongs(if the issue of responsibily does ever come up). If it had not been BishopMesrop, A. Hatisov, Dr. Zhavriev, S. Arutniov, Dro and Andranic, there wouldhave been others to do the same things in their place. If the formation ofbands was wrong, the root of that error must be sought much further andmore deeply. At the present time it is important to register only theevidence that we did participate in that volunteer movement to the largestextent and we did that contrary to the decision and the will of theGeneral Meeting of the Party.The Winter of 1914 and the Spring of 1915 were the periods ofgreatest enthusiasm and hope for all the Armenians in the Caucasus,including, of course, the Dashnagtzoutiun. We had no doubt that the warwould end with the complete victory of the Allies; Turkey would be defeatedand dismembered, and its Armenian population would at last be liberated.We had embraced Russia whole-heartedly without any compunction.Without any positive basis of fact we believed that the Tzarist governmentwould grant us a more-or-less broad self-government in the Caucasus and inthe Armenian vilayets liberated from Turkey as a reward for our loyalty, ourefforts and assistance.We had created a dense atmosphere of illusion in our minds. We hadimplanted our own desires into the minds of others; we had lost our sense ofreality and were carried away with our dreams. From mouth to mouth, fromear to ear passed mysterious words purported to have been spoken in the32palace of the Viceroy; attention was called to some kind of a letter byVorontzov-Dashkov to the Catholicos as an important document in our handsto use in the presentation of our rights and claims -a cleverly composedletter with very indefinite sentences and generalities which might beinterpreted in any manner, according to one’s desire.We overestimated the ability of the Armenian people, its political andmilitary power, and overestimated the extent and importance of the servicesour people rendered to the Russians. And by overestimating our verymodest worth and merit we were naturally exaggerating our hopes andexpectations.The deportations and mass exiles and massacres which took placeduring the Summer and Autumn of 1915 were mortal blows to the ArmenianCause. Half of historical Armenia -“ the same half where the foundations ofour independence would be laid according to the traditions inherited byEuropean diplomacy -“ that half was denuded of Armenians: the Armenianprovinces of Turkey were without Armenians. The Turks knew what theywere doing and have no reason to regret today. It was the most decisivemethod of extirpating the Armenian Question from Turkey.Again, it would be useless to ask today to what extent theparticipation of volunteers in the war was a contributory cause of theArmenian calamity. No one can claim that the savage persecutions wouldnot have taken place if our behavior on this side of the frontier was different,as not one can claim the contrary, that the persecutions would have been thesame even if we had not shown hostility to the Turks.This is a matter about which it is possible to have many differentopinions.The proof is, however - and this is essential -“ that the struggle begandecades ago against which the Turkish government brought about thedeportation or extermination of the Armenian people in Turkey and thedesolation of Turkish Armenia.This was the terrible fact!Civilized humanity might very well be shaken with rage in the face ofthis unspeakable crime. Statesmen might utter menacing words againstcriminal Turkey. “Blue”, “yellow”, “orange” books and papers might bepublished condemning them. Divine punishment against the criminals mightbe invoked in churches by clergymen of all denominations. The press of allcountries might be filled with horrible descriptions and details and thetestimony of eye-witnesses. . . Let them say this or that, but the work wasalready done and words would not revive the corpses fallen in the Arabiandeserts, rebuild the ruined hearths, repopulate the country now becomedesolate. The Turks knew what they ought to do and did it.The second half of 1915 and the entire year of 1916 were periods ofhopelessness, desperation and mourning for us. The refugees, all those whohad survived the holocaust, were filling Russian provinces by tens andhundreds of thousands. They were famished, naked, sick, horrified anddesperate floods of humanity, flooding our villages and cities. They had33come to a country which was itself ruined and famished. They piledupon each other, before our own eyes, on our threshold dying of famine andsickness. . .And we were unable to save those precious lives. Angered andterrified, we sought the culprits and quickly found them: the deceitfulpolitics of the Russian government. With the politically immature mindpeculiar to inconsequential men, we fell from one extreme to another. Justas unfounded was our faith in the Russian government yesterday, ourcondemnation of them today was equally blind and groundless.It was claimed that the Russians were intentionally slow to act,showed uncertainty and provided the grounds and the means for the Turks toslaughter the local Armenians. It was professed that the reason behind thisattitude on the part of the Russians was to vacate Armenia and later settlethe Kossacs there and that Count Lobanov-Rostovsky’s widely known project“Armenia without Armenians” was in progress.It was not only people, but our party and many of our citizens withcommon sense who also shared this idea.We were reluctant to understand that there did not have to be such aproject as “Armenia without Armenians” to explain the Russian stand andthat the Russian plans did not necessarily have to involve such an item asunconditionally taking on the defence of the Turkish Armenians. Such a plandefinitely did not exist. We were only projecting our own wishes on theRussian government and accusing them of disloyalty.Our volunteer units were naturally trying to capture Van and Muşwithout any waste of time. They headed for these places to save theArmenians. However, Russians did not only consist of Armenians and theyhad other intentions. Their sluggishness and uncertainty to act which weevaluated as disloyalty is explainable by the customary ineffectiveness of theRussian command ( which was witnessed many times on other fronts aswell) or other general military conditions unknown to us now.This incident being very much original and interesting, demands to betaken up individually. By an extraordinary mental aberration, we, a politicalparty, were forgetting that our Cause was an incidental and trivial phasefor the Russians, so trivial that if necessary, they would trample on ourcorpses without a moment’s hesitation.I am not saying that we did not know the circumstances. Of course weknew and understood and so we started when it was necessary to explain thesituation. Deep down in our hearts, however, we did not grasp the fullmeaning of that word-formula; we forgot what we already knew and we drewsuch conclusions as though our Cause was the center of gravity of the GreatWar, its cause, and its purpose. When the Russians were advancing, we usedto say from the depths of our subconscious minds that they were coming tosave us; and when they were withdrawing, we said they are retreating sothat they allow us to be massacred. . .34In both cases we misinterpreted the consequence withthe purpose and intention. We sought proofs of Russian treachery and ofcourse we found them - exactly as we sought and found proofs of the sameRussians- undeniable benevolence six months before. To complain bitterlyabout our bad luck and to seek external causes for our misfortune- that isone of the main aspects of our national psychology from which, of course,the Dashnagzoutiun is not free.One might think we found a spiritual consolation in the convictionthat the Russians behaved villainously towards us (later it would be the turnof the French, the Americans, the British, the Georgians, Bolsheviks - thewhole world -to be so blamed). One might think that, because we were sonaive and so lacking in foresight, we placed ourselves in such a position andconsidered it a great virtue to let anyone who so desired to betray us,massacre us and let others massacre us.In February 1917 the Russian Revolution broke out. New possibilitiesopened up before us unexpectedly.A democratic order was under way in Russia. Extremely importantsocial issues (such as appropriating the lands into public ownership) werewaiting to be solved. We, the socialists, and democrats welcomed this neworder with enthusiasm. Also, as a national political party, we concentrated onthe issues of taking over the administrative power from the central authorityand the autonomy of individual regions and peoples.We set out on a hard work.The old state mechanism needed to be changed and the local units ofthe new authority needed to be set up. The central government, which wasgoing through the first phases of the Revolution, did not have the means tolook into this question. The local cadres were wholly entrusted with thisissue. Social institutions such as political parties, workers’ unions, andnational governments were authorized with dealing with the issue (or, ratherthey took it upon themselves to deal with it).The issue of national participation in the government was a particularlycomplex and difficult question in Southern Caucasia. National councils amongwhich were Armenian councils were established in important centers.The Southern Caucasian Commissariat and Worker, Soldier andPeasant Soviets Southern Caucasian Center were established. These weretwo independent establishments of the central government and wereassigned with governing the region until governmental institutions were setup.“The Soviets Center” had lost its authority by the end of the year andit left the political scene. On the other hand, the Southern CaucasianCommissariat gained strength and turned into the governing power of thewhole Southern Caucasia.As it later proved to be in the Seym and in the Southern Caucasiangovernment, the “Commissariat” was also a coalition.35This coalition represented the parties in name and form and thenations, in essence. The main parties were: The Menshevik Fraction, theSocial Democrats, the Musavat, and the Armenian Revolutionary FederationDashnagzoutiun. These parties in fact represented the three main nations ofthe region: the Georgians, the Azerbaijani Tatars,49 and the Armenians.The Georgian Mensheviks assumed the authoritative position, theleading role in the Commissariat and later both in the Seym and in thegovernment.What was the reason?Here are some reasons:Firstly, the Commissariat had taken over its authority from theProvisional Government, or rather the State Duma circles in Petrograd. TheGeorgian representatives, over a long period of time, had acquired importantpositions and influence and had established contacts, relying on a strongorganization, which was the Russian Social Democratic Party. When a“Commissariat” was established in Southern Caucasia, the priority wasnaturally given to the Georgians and not to the Armenians and the Tatarswho were not conspicuous in the Duma.Secondly, there were people more or less experienced in state affairs,among the Georgians. These people had acquired some habits andexperience due to active participation in the work done in the Duma. Neitherwe, nor those from the Musavat, however, had been through such a schooland were not prepared. Musavat was new and Dashnagzoutiun was in factonly prepared for underground activity. Doubtlessly, the qualities of the partyleaders were also important to a certain extent. The Georgians had bred afew capable people or social leaders; we had nobody to sit next to them andwe used to sit behind them in the second or third rows.Another point was that in the times of the old regime, the state affairswere in the hands of the Georgians. This fact continued after the Revolution,for more people were to be found among the Georgians, who were capableenough to conduct technical work. Experience in official service naturallyformed a strong basis for the Georgians to gain further strength inadministrative duties. So was the situation from the “Commissariat” to theaffairs relating to the railways and the post and telegraph.The most important was the following: The Georgians were the bestorganizedpeople with the highest social consciousness in Southern Caucasia.On the other hand, there was no threat against the physical existence of theGeorgian people. For these reasons, the Georgians were stronger than theother peoples.The geographical location of the Georgian people and the fact thatthey inhabited the same area together, that they suffered fewer losses inthe War and also that they bred no mutual antagonism (serious enough to bea threat to their national existence) against their neighbors made them49 Tatars: The author here refers to the Azerbaijani Turks. Katchznouni sometimes prefers the word,“Tatar” is it was sometimes used by the Tsar regime but occasionally uses the word “Azerbaijanis” to referto the same people. (LA)36luckier in being able to be heard, in comparison to the Armenians and theAzerbaijanis.No matter what, the Georgians could be on better terms with Turkeyand Azerbaijan, compared to the Armenians. What was more, a Georgianpopulation outside the borders of Georgia, whose lives were under threat didnot exist. However, Armenians had kins living in Azerbaijan and so didAzerbaijanis, living in Armenia.The Georgians were living in peace and quiet on their own land;although they did have certain border problems with their neighbors, thesearose from imperialist claims and could easily be increased or completelysolved without putting the present or the future of Georgia under threat.On the other hand, the relations between Armenians and Turks andArmenians and Tatars were different. Between them there had beenproblems going on for centuries and it was impossible to solve them withoutmajor conflicts. Turkey, unconditionally defeated on the west, was trying toopen up a future for itself and consolidate it on the northeast. And here theArmenians interjected between Erzurum and Baku and blocked their way.Insolvable land problems stood between Armenians and Azerbaijanis .The problem was not occupying one or two towns but having the nationalpopulation inhabit an unbroken, continuous geography. This wish wasfostered both by the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis. Armenia could notsurvive without Şarur-Nakhichevan and the importance of Nakhichevan forArmenia was different from the significance of Zaqatala, Akhalkalaki, and Lorifor Georgia. This was why both Armenia and Azerbaijan were unlucky.It was perhaps possible for politically mature peoples to find peacefulsolutions. However neither we nor the Azerbaijanis were mature enough; forthis reason, the conflict between the two peoples had mutually become asource of antagonism and distrust.The Georgians used the Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Tatarconflicts cleverly (in other, stronger words, opportunistically), in order toconsolidate their privileged situation. Relying on Turks and Tatars andthreatening us with moving the borders in this or that way, they complicatedmatters for us and forced us to accept their conditions. Whenever theyneeded to ally with us, they started threatening the Azerbaijanis. This kind ofbehavior was politically an absolute blackmail and it provided a superiorityfor the Georgians over their neighbors and established their hegemony overothers.I have digressed a little but in order to make the political situationclear in that period in Southern Caucasia, it was necessary.Our party must understand and keep in mind that the party was underthe hegemony of the Georgian Social Democratic Party in the most difficultdays, and it acted abominably.In September 1917, the Armenian Convention met in Tiflis (Tbilisi). Anational board was established as its executive organ and was named theCentral National Council. This National Council later acted on behalf of the37Armenian people of Southern Caucasia and became the fullyauthorized representative of the nation.Dashnagzoutiun played the leading role both at the Convention andon the board and the council.Towards the end of the same year, elections were held in SouthernCaucasia for the members of All Russia Provisional Assembly.Out of the parties, which participated in the election campaigns, theMenshevik Social Democrats won 12, the Musavat won 10, and theDashnagzoutiun won 9 seats. The number of seats won by the other partieswas negligible.These three parties represented three great peoples who could belisted, according to their political weight, as the Georgians, the Tatars, andthe Armenians. These elections showed that the strongest, or rather the onlyorganized party was Dashnagzoutiun.The All Russia Provisional Assembly. could not meet. The BolshevikRevolution broke out in October and was triumphant in Moscow andPetrograd. The Soviet order was proclaimed and the meeting of the All RussiaProvisional Assembly was not permitted, as this assembly was considered tohave bourgeois tendencies.Southern Caucasia, loyal to the February Revolution did not recognizethe Soviet sovereignty and systemWhy?Because in this corner region the dominant parties preferred ademocratic platform based on a broad mass membership and for this reasonwould not accept especially a party dictatorship. On the other hand, theythought that the country was not mature enough for a fully socialist, letalone a communist regime (besides, the Musavat Party possessed nothing inthe name of socialism). The socialism of the Armenian RevolutionaryFederation Dashnagzoutiun was only on the surface and had no deep rootsamong the masses of people within the party. Among the GeorgianMensheviks, on the other hand, the nationalistic anti-Russian trend wasstrong.Secondly, the Georgian Mensheviks, which determined the atmospherein the political life of Southern Caucasia, had broken away from theBolsheviks and were openly opposing them.The Mensheviks who were loyal to their party regulations and thegeneral political line of their party, were pursuing here, exactly the samepolicy their Russian comrades were pursuing in Russia. The Musavat, whichhad enthusiastic desires about capturing Baku and had Panturkist ideals,wanted an immediate separation from Russia.The Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnagzoutiun had formedclose relations with the local Bolsheviks and was assisting them, in case theTatars would capture Baku. In Tiflis (Tbilisi), on the other hand, they couldnot close their eyes to the reality of the Georgians and Tatars and so could38not put in practice Bolshevik policies. They would not have been able to doso even if they had wanted. Anyway, they had no desire to do so, becausethe Bolshevik ideology and tactics did not appeal to them.Our Party stood in the anti-Bolshevik camp partly due to certainconvictions within the Party and partly because of being under the pressureof outside factors.I have to remind you here of the neutral and reluctant stand ourcomrades took in Baku. Baku, the industrial city, which bore a proletariat oftens of thousands and strong workers’ organizations, offered very favorableconditions for the development of Bolshevism. That city had been the onlyregion where the Bolsheviks could find a reliable sanctuary and a soundsupport in the whole Southern Caucasia since the first days of theRevolution. Baku did not refuse, in form, the sovereignty of the SouthernCaucasian Commissariat even after the October Revolution. In reality,however, the power was in the hands of two local organs: the SocialOrganizations Soviet and the Workers’ Representatives Soviet.In the first one, anti-Bolshevik groups, and in the second one theBolsheviks dominated.Our Party was represented on both the organs. Inside these organs,which were independent of each other and were of different nature, an openstruggle for domination was going on.In the first period, the Social Organizations Soviet was stronger (here,the mild socialists and the liberal bourgeoisie had formed a silent allianceagainst the Bolsheviks). The Workers’ Representatives Soviet was graduallygaining strength and by January 1918 it had gained control over the entiresituation.This Soviet was led by the Bolsheviks. Bolsheviks were not animportant force then; their accomplishments were essentially due to theinsecurity prevailing in the other camp.Only two parties, Dashnagzoutiun and Musavat could demonstrate anystrength against the Bolsheviks. However, though these two parties neededto act in alliance if they wanted to accomplish anything in the struggleagainst Bolshevism, this was unimaginable, for there was no mutual trust.Dashnagzoutiun was aware that its support for Musavat was required onlybecause of the Bolshevik threat. Musavat had to erase Dashnagzoutiun fromthe political scene, after having eliminated the Bolsheviks. No doubt, theBolsheviks would do the same to Dashnagzoutiun after having destroyed theMusavat with the help of armed Dashnag troops. For the Armeniancommunity, the Bolshevik dictatorship was more acceptable in comparison tothe Musavat dictatorship.The fact that our people got more and more involved in the Bolshevikmovement in Baku and that they provided a kind of sustenance to them isexplainable only with this.Just as we unintentionally came under the domination of the GeorgianMensheviks in Tiflis (Tbilisi), we were under the influence of the Bolsheviks in39Baku. In both cases the motivating force was the Turkish-Tatar threat.Bolsheviks wiped out Musavat in Baku with our support (March 1918); we,on the other hand were able to protect Baku against the Turkish-Tatarassault with the help of the Russian elements among the Bolsheviks.Later, again with our initiative, British forces were invited over fromIran. This happened in the last moments when the Bolsheviks were gettingready to escape to Russia and had got on the ships.If the British had been able to settle down firmly in Baku, the outcomeof the events would probably have been different. However, the few numbersof the British troops did not promote trust among the people and they goton their ships and went back to Iran.We were left alone; we did nothing else besides following the British toIran.The Azerbaijani government based in Gäncä so far, entered Baku withthe Turkish armed forces and the armed people. The Armenian people werestarted to be cruelly massacred; just as the Muslim people were massacred(on a smaller scale) in March during the Bolshevik-Musavat conflict.These incidents were happening outside Armenia, in one of the Tatarregions; nevertheless they were reflected on our political scene andconfused the situation and made it more difficult.The Tatars continually provoked the Turks against us and speeded uptheir assault, in order to be able to enter Baku. With this intention, they werevery cunningly speculating about the March incidents and were putting theblame of the incidents entirely on the Armenians. The Georgians weredispleased with our association with the Bolsheviks; they had doubts aboutus, thinking we were seeking for an opportunity to open the doors ofSouthern Caucasia to the Russian Bolsheviks. Apart from this, theyinterpreted having the British forces over in Baku when the Germans whichthey were flirting with, were in Tiflis (Tbilisi) as a betrayal of theGeorgian-German-Turkish-Tatar policies.As a result of the policies we practiced in Baku, our neighbors startedto regard us as independent allies. Our comrades in Baku, on the other hand,thought that they would be able to protect the rest of Armenia againstTurkish assaults by consolidating their existence in Baku and attracting theTurkish-Tatar forces to the city. They developed their policies in thisdirection.I am going back to the chronological sequence of events.At the end of November 1917 the Russian Army started to getdemoralized and the soldiers started to abandon their troops on theCaucasian front. The front was being destroyed in astonishing speed.At the end of January, there was no longer an army. NegligibleArmenian troops, with some soldiers left over from the army, were chargedwith defending the Erzurum line.40The situation in Southern Caucasia was getting more and moredangerous.The Bolshevik Revolution and the civil war spreading wider and widerevery day, had definitely torn away the outer regions from Russia.The Commissariat, which acted in the name of the ProvisionalGovernment led by Kerensky, lost the ground under their feet after theGovernment was turned out of office. There was a need to establish a newpower, authorized in the eyes of the public and capable of conductinggovernmental affairs independently and with greater authority. Such a powerwas established with the Southern Caucasian Seym and its Government.The Seym was formed out of the Southern Caucasian members of theAll Russia Provisional Assembly (by multiplying this number with three). Thusthe Mensheviks (Georgia) had 36, the Musavat (Azerbaijan) 30 and theDashnagzoutiun (Armenia) had 27 seats in the Seym.The Seym met in Tiflis (Tbilisi), the natural and indisputable capital ofSouthern Caucasia.At the first general congress on 10th February 1918, the executivecommittee report was read and the resignation of the Commissariat wasaccepted. Later, the Seym taking into consideration the fact that therelations between our region and Russia had been actually broken and that itwas uncertain as to when they would be reestablished, announced theindependence of the Southern Caucasian Democratic Republic and that it wasthe only institution which held the executive power in its hands. Within thiscontext, Y. Gegechkory (Georgian Menshevik) was assigned the task offorming a provisional government (a cabinet) responsible to the Seym .This did not mean a separation from Russia; it only reflected the actualsituation and was temporary. Internationally, Southern Caucasia wasconsidered to be an inseparable part of Russia.Encouraged by the increasing corruption of the Russian army, Turkishmilitary troops hastily got organized, got themselves in order and started tocapture one after the other, the regions they had lost. In the meantime, theTurkish Command (Vehip Paşa) started to initiate a cease-fire and thecontinuation of the peace talks.The Seym took a decision to stop the war and sat down for asettlement with the Turks.The first talks were conducted in Trabzon in March 1918. TheDashnagzoutiun fraction was able to add among other Seym demands thedemand for self-determination of the Armenians in Turkey within Ottomanborders, as a separate individual point (there were four separate demands).However, this demand ( which was very badly formulated and wasopen to negotiation) was immediately answered officially and was stated thatthe self-determination of the Turkish Armenians was an internal matter ofTurkey and nobody had the right to interfere with the internal affairs of41Turkey. Thus, they gave us the message that if we ever brought upthe issue of the Turkish Armenians, they would cut off any talks. TheSouthern Caucasians did not bring up the issue any more. The reason whythey had brought it up was clear; the Seam’s decision was only a gesture ofgood will towards the Armenians, and the Seym never had the intention ofinsisting on this demand. The Georgians were not inclined to get intoneedless trouble (they did not feel the need to); for the Azerbaijanis, on theother hand, the Turkish interests were more important than the future of theArmenians and even the Southern Caucasian Republic. The Armenianmembers of the delegation, were certainly not able to make the Tatars andthe Georgians accept their demands. To be just, it must be pointed out thateven if our allies at that time (the Georgians and the Tatars) had been ableto defend the Armenian demands most sincerely, they would not have beensuccessful. The balance of power was in Turkey’s favor and therefore therewas no reason why Turkey should give any concessions. This point was clearto us –the Armenian members of the delegation.The issue of borders became a hot subject of discussion.The Turks were convinced that the border between Southern Caucasiaand Turkey had been determined with the Brest Agreement signed by theBolsheviks. In the same manner, they stated they had come to Trabzon notto open this agreement to question but to establish friendly relations withtheir neighbor, the Southern Caucasian Republic. Southern Caucasia on theother hand, did not recognize the Brest Agreement and thought it was theSouthern Caucasian peoples who were authorized to decide about landconcessions to Turkey. In other words, the Southern Caucasian delegationdid not want to accept that the Soviet government was legally authorized (onthe grounds that this government was not recognized within Russia itself andon the other hand that according to the slogan of self determination voicedduring the period of the Great War, the real owners of Southern Caucasiawas not the Russian Government, no matter how legitimate it might be, butthe peoples of the region themselves).It was very difficult to defend this stand not only because it was newand controversial in international law, but also because the Turkish Army wasgrowing stronger every day and the Southern Caucasian Army was on theverge of breaking down. In international affairs it is no secret that thepowerful party proves to be right.Another reason why it was difficult to defend this attitude was becausethe delegation was not in unity within itself.Because the Georgians were primarily concerned with the issues ofBatoum and Ajaria , in order to be able to secure all this region, they wereinclined to leave Kars and Ardahan to Turks.However, Armenians needed Kars. We were ready to give Ajaria bigconcessions in order to get Kars in return. The Azerbaijanis, on the otherhand, as the fourth (or if Dagestan is taken into consideration, the fifth)republic of the Southern Caucasian Federation, wanted a SouthwesternMuslim Republic to be established in Ajaria. If not, they thought, Ajaria oughtto be attached to Turkey. They did not want it to be attached to Georgia.42The Azerbaijanis defended completely the same view with theTurks concerning Kars and Ardahan. They considered Kars and ArdahanTurkish territory and therefore regarded it quite natural that they should beattached to Turkey.Turks were very closely informed about our inner conflicts andtherefore insisted on their views.There was another issue which invoked a big discussion: Turkswanted Southern Caucasia to be declared independent of Russia and thoughtthat an agreement with us would only then be possible.The Southern Caucasian delegates insistently stated that SouthernCaucasia was physically separated from Russia and was in fact independent.Turks, on the other hand, quite rightly declared that in order for aninternational agreement to be signed, a de facto situation was not sufficientand that a legal foundation was needed and that to bring this about,certain formalities had to be carried out.These unproductive talks went on for about a month. It was to Turks’advantage that the talks went on for so long (otherwise, they would haveended them any moment). Time was passing, our military force and defensepotential was continuously getting weaker whereas those of the Turks weregetting stronger. While we were busy with holding meetings and withcorrespondence in Trabzon, the Turkish Army was advancing without meetingany obstruction. They captured Erzurum at the end of March and Batoum atthe beginning of April.Nevertheless, the Seym would not admit defeat.When it was clear that Turks would not make any compromises onanything that was included in the Brest Agreement, the Seym withdrew itsdelegation and the Trabzon talks broke up (this was called “a break”).Internal discord within the Seym and inside the government of theFederation , which had been going on since the first days, was more clearlyprominent now.Turkish success encouraged the Azerbaijanis; their delegation had abetter chance to sit down with the Turks and talk in Trabzon (and theycertainly did use it). In the Seym the Azerbaijanis did not hide that theysided with the Turks. Defending and developing the Turkish view, theydemanded that Southern Caucasia be speedily separated from Russia,Turkey be given considerable concessions and also the war be ended, havingcome to an agreement with Turkey; for they stated that as Muslimdemocrats, their religious sentiments prevented them from getting activelyinvolved in a fight with the Turks.These words, expressed by a Musavat speaker in the Seym shouldhave been understood as a possibility that the Southern Caucasian Tatarswould fight against us, let alone fighting on our side, (they had neveractually been on our ranks and had never fought on the Turkish front) if thewar with Turkey was continued.The Georgians hesitated, as if they were the Menshevik fraction of theSeym.43They harbored two trends, two different tendencies (the Russiantendency and the German-Turkish tendency). Those that were inclinedtowards Russia did not definitely want a separation from Russia, but becausethey evaluated the Brest Agreement as unacceptable, thought that instead ofa peace with such conditions, a war was more acceptable. Therepresentatives of the second trend were against Russia; They thought theRussian threat against Georgia was more important than the Turkish threat.Therefore, they were ready to give very big concessions to Turkey, to be ableto compromise (to speak openly, they were trying to give concessions in thename of Armenia, to be able to save at least Batoum and the harbor there, ifnot the whole Ajaria).The Armenians (Dashnagzoutiun fraction in the Seym) did not want toseparate from Russia nor did they have positive expectations from Turkey.The Armenians would rather stop Turkish attacks with armed force, becausethey believed that it was going to be them, rather than anybody else (orperhaps only them) who would suffer losses and they still hoped they werecapable of future military victories.The Armenian National Assembly met in Alexandropol (Guru) in Apriland took up this issue. Despite the presentation made there, by the author ofthese lines, it was agreed that the Brest Agreement should be refused andthe war should be continued. However, this decision could never be put intopractice, because we were not in a position to assert our ideas, we could noteven determine our own fate.The indecision of the Georgians did not last long. The German-Turkishtrend was victorious in the Seym and as a result of this victory, the Seymannounced boisterously on April 22 that Southern Caucasia parted fromRussia. On this occasion, the Georgian and the Tatar leaders made veryemotional speeches at the Seym meeting. The Dashnag fraction supportedthe proposal of separation but did not make any speeches.It was not easy for us to accept this separation, but there was noother way. If we had opposed, the Southern Caucasian Federation wouldhave broken down; the Georgians and the Tatars would have agreed toreconcile with the Turks and we would have been left alone; and we wouldhave been standing against the Turkish Army. Russia (neither the Bolshevikone nor the anti-Bolshevik one) could not have helped us even if they hadwanted to. We were not only alone, but behind our lines it was also notsecure; for it was clear that the Azerbaijanis and (perhaps the Georgians tooin order to capture Akhalkalaki(Ahılkelek), Lori and Pembek) would comeagainst us. We needed the Southern Caucasian Confederation more thananybody else and did not want it to break down. This was why we acted inthe same direction as our neighbors did.On April 25, Kars fell; and with almost no fighting, for directives werereceived from Tiflis (Tbilisi) to surrender the fortress to the Turks. Thistreacherous directive had been sent without our knowledge and it arousedgreat reaction among our people. That day the fate of the Federation lookedvery critical.44However, what was done was done. The Kars fortress which wasour most strategic area was now in the hands of the Turks; there was noroom for hesitation and neglect. The Seym accepted the Brest Agreement asthe reference and decided to continue the talks which broke up in Trabzon.The new phase of the talks started in Batoum on the first days of May(where the Turks had quite comfortably settled for some time). This time theTurks had a different approach. The Brest Agreement was no longersatisfactory for them. They were saying that following the Trabzon talksthere was more bloodshed and that this had to be compensated. They mainlydemanded more land compensations from Armenia. Long and useless talksstarted again. The Brest Agreement which we did not want to hear about afew months ago in Trabzon, became our sole wish now. However, it wasimpossible to persuade the Turks. They had gripped our throat tightly and didnot want to let go.On May 15, the Turkish troops crossed Arpaçay (Arpatchai) which wasthe border according to the Brest agreement, and invaded Alexandropol(Guru ) in a few hours and moved towards Karakilise.The situation was unacceptable.Tiflis (Tbilisi), which was the capital of Georgia and Southern Caucasia,was also under threat. No further advance was made in the talks going on inBatoum.The discord in the Seym could not be settled with any compromise. Anexplosion was inevitable.The Georgians were able to see that we were a useless burden on theirshoulders and they could very easily solve their own problems without us.The Azerbaijanis, on the other hand, had one wish: Joining the Turks toinvade Baku right away. Following the Turkish victory, the Azerbaijanis hadno longer any need for the Southern Caucasian Federation. They did notneed the Georgians and they saw the Armenians as their enemy.The moment of breaking down had come.On May 26, the Seym abolished itself and abandoned its rights, takinginto consideration that there were fundamental disagreements concerningwar and peace issues .On the same day and in the same building, Georgian National Councilbombastically declared the sovereignty of Georgia.One day later Armenia took the same step.Now it was Armenia’s turn.Was it right to declare our sovereignty; did we have the means toestablish our own state and maintain it?These questions were absurdly unnecessary. We had neither the placenor the time to organize elections. History had brought us to a certain point.We had to gather courage and solve this problem, for we did not want todisappear. We had to own our country, otherwise, we were going to lose itforever. A small hesitation and neglect would create a situation of res nullius45(nobody’s property) and in such a situation we would become a warbooty for our neighbors, the Turks, the Georgians and the Tatars.On May 28, late at night, the Central National Council declaredArmenia a sovereign state and itself the highest sovereign organ of thisstate.The Council had not received any such authority from the NationalBoard, but nevertheless they did not hesitate in the face of such a formalobstacle and in the following years nobody thought of accusing the Councilof transgressing their authority. Everybody was aware that there was noother way.On May 22-26 the battle of Serdarabat and on May 25-28 thebattle of Karakilise were fought.The Armenian people had gathered all their strength to defend theirexistence. No doubt these fierce battles, the brave resistance that thepeople (there was no longer an army) showed (especially around Karakilise)significantly raised our standing in the eyes of the Turks and provided theopportunity for a settlement.The Armenian delegates who were now acting on behalf of theArmenian Republic and who had been authorized by the National Councilreturned to Batoum and a treaty was signed on June 4.It was a new phase in the life of the Armenian people; a phase of therevival of a state organization, which had, been lost long ago.On August 1, The Armenian Parliament began to work in Yerevan(Erivan) and the first government was formed.The parliament had been formed by tripling the present number of theNational Council members. 6 Muslims, 1 Russian and 1 Yezid member wasadded to the other members. The majority belonged to the ArmenianRevolutionary Federation Dashnagzoutiun. Because our fraction held 18 votesout of the 47 and because we could not form a bloc with any other fraction,the Parliament had no stable center and a definite political identity.The government was not stable either. The cabinet changed four timesduring the first 10 months, but the head of the government was always thesame person.The first governments that were formed were all coalitions (theDashnags, the Cadets and an independent war Minister). The coalitiongovernment was not founded on a sound basis, because it did not have asafe majority in the parliament (the Cadets often took a different coursefrom the Dashnags). What was more important was that there was nocommon agreement among the parties forming the government, on the basisof the program. The attitude our party had towards the government was alsoan obstacle in this context.Now I would like to take up a mistake, which I find very important andexplain it, below.46Armenia was a Democratic Republic. It had the proper organsof a democratic-parliamentarian government: a legislative body composedof the people’s representatives and a responsible administration. TheParliament was composed of representatives from the four existing Partiesand minorities with the widest true democratic principles. The governmentreceived its authority from the legislative body and was responsible to it.This was the form. But the reality was otherwise. In practice our Partytended to subject to itself, to control, the legislative body and thegovernment. We did not have the courage, nor the ability to declare anopen dictatorship, but did not wish to remain within parliamentarian limitseither and tried to establish in Armenia the “Ittihad”50 system -a partydictatorship disguised as a democracy. An intolerable dualism resulted fromit - on the surface the Parliament and the government; behind the scenes,invisible, the Party and its organs.Naturally, these two types of authority, which were practiced officiallyand unofficially, were only obstructing one another. The official rulesprevented the party from acting freely and fast and exposing its own will;the manipulations of the party also prevented the government from actingwith its own initiative. This factor made it extremely difficult to formcoalitions. Actually, the foreign elements of the coalition government had topractice the policies, which had been decided outside the government, inparty offices, which did not belong to them, and they had no control over.Last summer, I prepared a report on this sensitive issue andpresented it to the Party Congress, as I was instructed by the related partyorgan. My report was read at the regional meeting, which met inConstantinople’s.Here I will suffice with a few lines on this issue.In November a general peace was declared. Germany and its allieslost the war.The German troops left Georgia in haste. Turks also receded back intotheir old territory.Towards the end of the month, British troops –the troops of our allyenteredBatoum. We started to entertain new hopes. It appeared as if oursituation in Southern Caucasia would radically change, for the victorious andthose which replaced the German troops in Tiflis (Tbilisi) were our allies. Wehad fought against a common enemy. We certainly would attain the privilegeof special friendship of the British, compared to the Georgians who had flirtedwith the Germans and to the Azerbaijanis who had openly went over to theTurkish side.We were once more wrong. The British saw no difference among us.They acted as if either they did not know that we had been their ally or hadforgotten this. The generosity they showed towards the Georgians and theAzerbaijanis was unexpected and incomprehensible. We certainly did not like50 The Ittihad (The Committee of Union and Progress) represented the resurgence of the Young Turkmovement in 1909 against the oppressions of Sultan Hamid. It started as a revolutionary movementfriendly to the Dashnags and Dashnag aspirations, but it soon followed the established pattern of massacre,bloodshed and rabid Turkish fanaticism.47this attitude of the British and thought they were disloyal. This wasthe easiest way of explaining to ourselves an incomprehensible situation. Wecontented that they were unfaithful and we were relieved. We did notexamine the reasons for this unfaithfulness.At the beginning of December, a war between Georgia and Turkeybroke out but did not last long. When the Turks moved from Alexandropol(Guru) to Pembek and captured Karakilise, the Georgians took theopportunity and sent troops to the Lori region of Armenia. Nevertheless,even when Turks receded, the Georgians did not want to vacate Lori. On thecontrary, they took every opportunity to secure their presence there.They ruthlessly suppressed the resistance of the people of the region.Lori became a matter of dispute and the gravest border question betweenArmenians and Georgians.Georgia broke us off the rest of the world, in order to be able to applypressure on us they imprisoned us inside our borders. Even the wheat whichwas imported into our country in order to feed our immigrants, wasobstructed in Georgia and could not properly reach its destination.Georgia invaded Lori and closed the railway. We were surrounded. Thiswas actually a reason to declare war on Georgia. The revolt of someArmenian villages in Lori and the severe measures taken by the Georgiangovernment was a direct reason for declaring war. It was as if the Georgiangovernment was looking for reasons to massacre Armenians.Probably the provocations of the Russian officers serving in our armyalso played a part. The government in Georgia was trying to diminish theRussian factor (which was quite strong in Tiflis-Tbilisi), curb its influence, andnationalize the state apparatus. For this reason they were dismissing theRussian officials and officers and were expelling them from Georgia in biggroups.A significant number of Russian officers were serving in our army andthese officers had connections in Tiflis (Tbilisi) (and perhaps also in thevolunteer units of the Dennikin Army). It was probably the same people whoprovoked our military circles in order to create the hostile atmosphereneeded to start a military operation.The war lasted only three weeks. On December 31, the Britishinterfered and a settlement was made. Lori was temporarily declared aneutral zone and a common Armenian-Georgian authority was establishedthere, under the supervision of the British commissar.In this way, the war had concluded favorably for us. We had partiallyachieved our aim (the railway connection was reestablished with the help ofthe British). Nevertheless, the war made us think over many issues. We werea very young state with a history of only 4-5 months and this country whichwas in need of many things had fought a war. We had been fighting with aneighbor with whom we had to have the closest relations, for we could onlyestablish connections with the rest of the world over Georgia.48We were aware of that and sincerely wished to have friendlyrelations with the Georgians, but we were not able to accomplish that. Thereasons were both the attitude the Georgians took towards us and our ownweakness, political inadequacy and our inaptitude to use the state apparatus.Here, I also have to call attention to the continuous fights goingon within and outside our national borders.We were officially at war with Azerbaijan, because we were actuallyfighting with them in Karabagh (Karabağ). There were often clashes inQazax(Kazak) too. Inside the country, at certain places like Agapapa(Akbaba), Zot (Zod), Zanki-Bazar(Zengibasar), Vedi-Bazar (Vedibasar),Sharur-Nakhichevan, (Şarur-Nahçıvan) Zangezour (Zengezur) etc. manybloody battles were fought with the native Muslim inhabitants.And also there is no doubt that the attitude of Azerbaijan in thismatter was hostile. Also it is indisputable that the native Muslim inhabitantshad been acting against the Armenian state because they were encouragedby Turkey and Azerbaijan. What is important is that we had not been able totake the precautions either within our country or outside it, to secure ourstand. We could not establish an acceptable modus vivendi with Azerbaijan.We were not able to establish order by means of administrative methods, inthe Muslim regions; we were obliged to use arms, send troops, demolish andmassacre. We were not successful even in these; so much so that thisfailure shook the prestige of the central authority. In important points suchas Vedibasar and Şarur-Nakhichevan we were not able to establish ourauthority even with arms; we lost and receded.On May 28, 1919 on the anniversary of our independence, theParliament declared Armenia “united”: in other words, declared that weincluded the land which would possibly be saved from Turkish sovereigntyinto the present Armenian territory. This step was considered by someTurkish Armenians as usurping their rights, because they found it extremelydangerous from the point of view of the Armenian question. They made agreat fuss, they protested and the Armenian problem in Turkey was oncemore brought very heavily against the Armenian question in Russia. Theliberal bourgeoisie inside and outside the country called this an irresponsiblebehavior on the part of Dashnagzoutiun and started acting furiously towardsthe party.These objections and worries were all ungrounded. TheDashnagzoutiun had no intention of usurping their rights or doing anyplotting, besides, it was later understood that this step would not harm theArmenian question in Turkey. The May Declaration had no effect whatsoeveron the Armenian question in Turkey and nobody ever even became aware ofit.It was later seen that the hopes the people who prepared thisdeclaration cherished to increase the political significance of Armenia and tofacilitate the diplomatic work done in Europe were in vain. No change hadbeen brought about in the situation, in the eyes of the European diplomacy.A single declaration of our parliament, this meager record which had notbeen supported with the necessary activities could not have changed theeffect of realities. It could have been expected that our national delegation in49Paris would be abolished, but it was not. Even following May 28, twodiplomatic missions in Europe (The Delegation of the Republic and theNational Delegation) continued to function side by side ; they were assignedto advocate the same issues in the same places to the same people.However, it proved difficult to compromise the activities of these two organswho were competing for authority. In this way, our undivided front in Europewas divided. In Armenia, on the other hand, it became difficult to find anopportunity to have a coalition with liberal elements and for this reason ourparty was more isolated.The psychological demands which led us to announce the FederalArmenia Declaration are explicable.The political considerations which led us and which justified thedeclaration are also understandable. However, it is a fact that this declarationdid not lead to any favorable results; its unfavorable results (domestic strifeand conflicts) are, on the other hand, very clear.The Armenian Parliament opened on August 1, 1919. The electionstook place in accordance with the democratic procedure - general, equal,direct and secret balloting - but it was strange and disheartening that 72 outof 80 members were Dashnaks, with only four members from the otherparties. There was no opposition party to act as a check. We Dashnaksseemed to be victorious but did not understand that it was not a Parliamentbut the caricature of a Parliament.We could not understand that elections proved that our people were not yetready for an independent political life. We were not aware that ourparliamentary victory was not actually a victory but a defeat and that bysending 72 members into the parliament we had lost the ground we trod on,the democratic foundation.We did not understand that as we assumed authority, at the sametime, we were also assuming all the responsibility. We lacked the necessaryprovisions and elements. We could not understand that a strong oppositionwas needed simply to discipline us and to prevent us from transgressing thepresent law and order. We also did not understand that by carrying our partymeetings into the parliament we were actually bringing the existence of ourparty to an end.There was no Parliament; it was an empty form without content. Theproblems of state were being discussed and solved behind closed doors, inthe rooms of the Dashnag faction, and then declared from the rostrum of theParliament.In reality, there was not even a parliamentary faction, becausethis latter was under the very strict supervision of the Dashnag Bureau, andwas obliged to carry out its orders. There was not a government either. This,also, was subject to the Bureau; it was a kind of executive body for theBureau in the state. This was the Bolshevistic system. But what theBolsheviks were doing openly and consistently, we were attempting to veilunder democratic forms.50On the first days of May 1920 there were Bolshevik demonstrationsand attempts at uprising. These were suppressed without much effort,because they had no basis; Bolshevism was strange to us. There was alsono outside support.Nevertheless, there was also an interesting situation. A group of youngBolsheviks (even in Yerevan (Erivan) in front of the eyes of the government)were making noisy demonstrations and propaganda among the militarytroops, occupying the train station in Guru and capturing an armored trainThis proves that the government was irresponsible, weak andignorant.Following the Bolshevik rebellious efforts of May 1920, there was a“coup d’etat” and the A.R.F. Bureau (the so-called “Bureau Government”)replaced the Parliament with its own dictatorial rule. By order of the Bureauthe resignation of Prime Minister A. Khadissian was accepted on May 5, andby order of the Bureau Dr. H. Ohanchanian was ordered to form a newcabinet; the latter presented the already-prepared list of ministers in thesame meeting in which he was ordered to form a new cabinet. That was theBureau itself. Parliament was ordered indefinitely recessed. The ArmenianParliament had given a dictatorial government to the Dashnagzoutiun - to theBureau.This was against the decision of the 9th General Meeting ofthe A.R.F. and had many disadvantages, but it also had the advantage ofcoming out in the open in its true form and color.The Armenian-Turkish war, which broke our back, began inthe Fall of 1920. Would it have been possible to evade it? Probably not.The crushed Turkey of 1918 had recovered during the two years. There cameforward patriotic, young officers who formed a new army in Asia Minor. Theysaw the necessity of attacking in the Northeast, and also in the Southwestagainst the Greeks which they could not do without first crushing their flankon the Armenian front. One cannot say that the Turks really had such a plan,but it is possible that they did and it was also probable that the war with uswas inevitable.Despite these hypotheses there remains an irrefutable fact.That we had not done all that was necessary for us to have done to evadewar. We ought to have used peaceful language with the Turks whether wesucceeded or not, and we did not do it. We did not do it for the simple reason-no less culpable - that we had no information about the real strength of theTurks and relied on ours. This was the fundamental error. We were not afraidof war because we thought we would win. With the carelessness ofinexperienced and ignorant men we did not know what forces Turkey hadmustered on our frontiers. When the skirmishes had started the Turksproposed that we meet and confer. We did not do so and defied them.I should point out that in the autumn of 1920 we were not a quantitienegligible in the eyes of Turks. The terrible incidents of the past years wereforgotten. Our people were well rested and our army was well armed withBritish arms. We had sufficient ammunition. We were holding a very51important fortress called Kars in our hands. Finally there was the SévresTreaty and it was not simply a piece of paper in those days, it was animportant gain against Turks. We were not in a similar position to what wewere in May 1918 in Batoum. We could easily believe we could be heard,because Turks were considered the defeated party.We did not make an attempt.If we had accepted their offer what would they have proposed to us?They would probably have started from where we had left at Batoum andBrest and then they would have given further concessions and recededbehind the 1814 borderlines. They could possibly have withdrawn further andcould have handed over Beyazıt and Eleşkirt too.Turks would never have given any further concessions than these inSeptember 1920 and in return, they were going to demand from theArmenian government that they give up the rights advanced by the SévresTreaty.How would the Armenian government have reacted to this?They would certainly have refused the offer. The government wouldnever have agreed to these conditions; they would have preferred fighting.Not only the Dashnag Bureau-Government but also any Armeniangovernment would have acted in the same way. I am calling attention to thisfact. And this quite significantly alleviates the crime committed by our party.The government could never have accepted these conditions; because all thepolitical parties and groups, all our diplomats, all the appointed and voluntarypatriots… all would have revolted, rejected the government and accused it oftreason. The Sévres Treaty had blinded everyone’s eyes.We now see that if we had agreed on a settlement with the Turksdirectly (in spite of the Sévres Treaty) we might have gained a lot. But wecould not see this at that point.All these are possibilities, but they are also the reflections of ourthoughts then.War, on the other hand, was a reality.It is also a reality, an unforgivable reality that we did not do anythingto avoid war but did just the opposite; we created excuses for it. What isunforgivable is that we had no idea about the military power of Turkey andneither did we know our own army.The war resulted in our indisputable defeat. Our army was well fed,well armed, and dressed but it did not fight. The troops were constantlyretreating and deserting their positions; they threw away their arms anddispersed in the villages.Our army was demoralized during the period of internal strife,the inane destructions, and the pillages that went without punishment. It wasdemoralized and tired. The system of roving bands, which was especiallyencouraged by the Bureau government, was destroying the unity of themilitary organization. The instruction of the army, its military spirit, itsorganization and discipline, and therefore its power for defense had52deteriorated to the last degree, and that was a surprise to thegovernment: the government and the ministers of war did not know theirown army.And then the government made a fatal mistake. Intending toincrease the number of troops, it called under arms additional men who werepast middle age and tired, overburdened with family and financial burdens.They were made to put on the military uniforms in a great hurry; rifles wereput into their hands and instantly sent to the front. These were ready-madedeserters, which caused additional defections and demoralization in the ranksof the army.When on November 2 [1920] the victorious armies ofKarabekir had reached Alexandropol (Guru), the Bureau-governmentpresented its resignation. It could not stay in power any longer; it wasbeaten, and on account of its defeat it had been discredited.Then it became necessary to begin negotiations with theTurks and it became necessary that those who negotiated should be newfaces. After a short indecision, the government of Simon Vratzian wasformed, composed of Dashnags and social revolutionaries. Dashnag ministersbelonged to the “Left” wing of the Party, while he, the prime minister[Vratzian] was known to be a man of the Russian orientation, and thesocialist revolutionaries had personal ties in the Armenian Bolshevik circles.There was a remote hope that in the event the Bolsheviks came to power(a fact we were beginning to understand was inescapable) a governmentwith such a composition would be able to find a common language withthe new comers.The Turks had already occupied Alexandropol. In themeantime the Armenian Bolsheviks at the head of the Red troops enteredItchevan and Dilijan. Was there an understanding between the Bolsheviksand the Turks? In our ranks that conviction was widespread. I think,however, that it was wrong; in all events there was no positive proof. It isprobable that the Bolshevik agents (or individuals with Bolshevik leanings)were trying to destroy our Army from the inside, but for that it was notnecessary to have an agreement with the Turks.The plot of the Bolsheviks was not the reason for our defeat,nor the power of the Turks (which was not important at that time) but ourown ineptness! Of course the Bolsheviks benefited from our defeat and thatwas very natural, but it was not essential that they should have come to anunderstanding with the Turks for that purpose.The reason for our defeat was not the treachery of the Bolsheviks orthe strength of the Turks but our weakness. The Bolsheviks certainly madeuse of our defeat, this was only natural. They did not need to arrive at apreliminary understanding with the Turks.It was not difficult to see that the Bolsheviks who had been victoriousin Russia and had settled in Azerbaijan, were obliged to enter Georgia andArmenia too. It was only a matter of time. They needed to choose afavorable time so that they would not have to spend too much effort. It was53Armenia’s turn now and the Bolsheviks did in December whatthey had not been able to do in May.On December 1 (or November 30) our delegates signed an agreementwith the Turks in Alexandropol , which was not much different from the crueltreaty of Batoum. On December 1 that same Vratzian government resignedand relinquished its power to the Bolsheviks.The Bolsheviks entered Armenia without meeting anyresistance. This was the decision of our Party. There were two reasons foracting this way; first, we could not resist it even if we wanted to -we weredefeated; second, we hoped that the Soviet authorities, backed by Russia,would be able to introduce some order in the state - a thing which we, allalone, had failed to do, and it was very plain already that we would not beable to do.It was our desire to let the Bolsheviks rule the country withoutany obstruction, to remain loyal to the new government, to cooperate withtheir useful work. This decision was not unanimous. There wereirreconcilables who did not expect anything good from the Bolsheviks; theydemanded opposition and fighting, even though the defeat was inevitable.Small was their number; when the proposal was refused those most inopposition left the country and fled.There was also another minority, opposed to the first one:this one wanted to approach the Bolsheviks as a party matter and form apolitical block with them. These were segregated and came to be known asLeftist Dashnags, and made declarations in Bolshevik spirit. They did notsucceed. The Bolsheviks with reason distrusted them, and discarded them.In the two and a half months until the Februarian revolt, theBolsheviks governed the country. The hopes of the optimists did not cometrue. The political and financial expectations from Russia were not realized. Aregime, which could be defined in no other way than “autocracy and infinitepressure”, was established.Every type of dictatorship essentially means pressure and the reverseis not possible. All revolutions need to take decisive and extraordinarymeasures in their struggle, when they come to power; this is an essentialneed and is due to the nature of things. However what the Bolsheviks did inArmenia had one characteristic: they were aimless and arbitrary.If the Bolsheviks had applied sufficient political tactics in the firstphases (which they later did), they would have guaranteed their presence inArmenia, for there were no opposing forces in the country. However, theBolsheviks did not understand this, started looking for counterrevolutionariesin absurd places, and provoked the people against them.The Februarian revolt is solely their own doing; it was the result oftheir pressures, their autocratic behavior and their endless confiscationswhich used up the last remains of the economy and deprived the people whoalready had nothing to eat, of their last morsels.54Dashnagzoutiun not only did not take part in the organization ofthis revolt, it was also opposed to it.I know that some Dashnags somehow had some connections with thepreparations in some villages, before the actual revolt. However, it was notthe doing of our party but of individual members. However, after the revoltbroke out, our party became active; it followed the masses and then led anaction, which it had no part in the preparations of.At the end of the revolt, the Bolsheviks were pushed out of centralArmenia towards the peripheral regions (Sharur and Qazax regions). An“Armenian Salvation Committee” was immediately founded, came to power,and led the struggle.The civil war lasted for 1,5 months.In our circles, the tendency to explain the defeat of the revoltingpeople by the supremacy of the Bolshevik forces is commonplace. However, Ido not share this view. Some people really struggled well and were reallycourageous; but those were not our people but the Bolsheviks. If ourpeople had fought well, they could have suppressed the enemy on theGemerli and Yelenov fronts (anti-Bolshevik Georgia was still resisting and theBolsheviks were not able to get any outside help and their own forces werenot numerous). The reason for this bad fighting on our part was not due toreluctance (if it were, we would not have rebelled and shown the enthusiasmwitnessed in Yerevan in the first days of the revolt); we did not have faith inour own strength and did not believe in success.The revolt was a spontaneous and casual action. It broke out at anunexpected moment, flared, and soon died down. I am not trying to say thatif the insurgents had fought well, the Soviet government could have beenbrought down; no, defeat was inevitable (especially after the fall ofGeorgia). We could have slain all the Bolsheviks in Armenia (it would nothave been difficult if the revolt had been more organized), but behind themwas Russia with its Red Army. The Armenian peasants or the DashnagzoutiunParty was not going to resist that. However, what I would like to point out isthat the revolt was destined to be defeated, because it cherished no faith invictory.When the Bolsheviks reached Kanakir and occupied Yerevan(Erivan), we left Yerevan(Erivan) for Dereleğez through Baş-Garni.A large mass of people who did not know where and why they weregoing, were also on the move, along with the insurgents and the partymembers.The inevitable defeat was brought about. In the following two or threemonths, what happened in Dereleğez and Zengezour was no longer a fightbut death throes.After the fall of Yerevan, it was time to sovietize the mountainouspart of Armenia. Our presence there might even have speeded up the flow ofevents.55We had thought that by moving into the mountainousArmenia, we would add to the strength of the native people and increasetheir capacity to resist. We had not taken into consideration that a defeatedmilitia who were on retreat could increase the demoralization andhelplessness of frightened masses of people. The native people did not favorand welcome us. We would rather not be seen by them. On top ofeverything, we had to share their last bits of food. We had, unintentionally,invited confusion to their lives. A firm contradiction arose between the nativeand outside Armenian authorities.The military forces were dissolving day by day. Some of the soldierswho had accompanied us and who did not like the way they were treated bythe native people, were now thinking about going back home. The groupswho consisted of the Turkish Armenians (both armed and unarmed ones)were trying to reach Aras (Araxe) and then pass to Iran. The native peoplenow saw that the army was breaking up and there was disorganization. Theystarted to doubt their own strength.At the end of the summer, Zangezour, which was the lastheadquarters of the Democratic Republic, was wiped out.Armenia was completely sovietized.In the meanwhile, what had been our diplomatic activity with the outerworld during our liberty as an independent nation -Constantinople, Europeand America - and what were the results? In the Spring of 1919, the ParisDelegation of our Republic presented a Memorandum of our demands to thePeace Conference in Paris jointly with the National Delegation of theArmenians in Turkey. According to that Memorandum the frontiers of theArmenian State would include:A. The Caucasian Republic with enlarged territory (the entire districtof Yerevan, the districts of Kars without the northern part of Ardahan, thesouthern section of the Tiflis territory, the south-western part of Kantzag);B. The seven vilayets of Turkish Armenia (Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakır,Harput, Sivas, Erzurum and Trabzon, excluding only the southern section ofDiyarbakır and the western section of Sivas);C. The four sanjaks of Cilicia (Maraş, Sis, Djebel-Bereket and Adanawith Alexandretta).A vast state was being organized and demanded - a great Armenia fromthe Black Sea to the Mediterranean, from the mountains of Karabagh to theArabian Desert. Where did that imperial, amazing demand emanate from?Neither the government of Armenia nor the Dashnagzoutiun hadenvisaged such a childish and foolish plan. On the contrary, ourDelegation had carried with it from Yerevan very moderate demands,commensurate with our very modest ability.How did it happen that our Delegation signed the “From Seato Sea” demand? It was told that if they did not demand those fascinatingfrontiers, the Turkish-Armenians (through their National Delegation) wouldsever their Cause from that of the “Republic of Ararat” and will apply to the56Powers accordingly. Our Delegation was also told that America would notaccept a mandate over a small Armenia but would accept one over a "FromSea to Sea" Armenia. Because it would have been dangerous to proceed withthe defense of our Cause with two separate bodies, each with a contradictorydemand, and because the American mandate was what we wanted, ourdelegates signed the Memorandum and presented it to the Powers.I wish [therefore] to prove once more that our Party has notmanaged national affairs, has not had a strong will, has not followed our ownprogram, but it has been led by others and has allowed the others to leadour Party.The Paris Memorandum of course thrilled us. A kind ofmentality was created according to which the drawing of frontiers on paperactually gave us those territories. To doubt it was a treachery. Of coursethere followed the rude awakening - the Treaty of Sévres51. the refusal of theSenate of the United States to accept the mandate; even the frontiers drawnby President Wilson did not satisfy us. We thought he could have demandeda larger territory . . . There were the usual complaints that the powerswere unfair, did not appreciate us and did not compensate us accordingto what we deserved.. However, these narrow borders were an inaccessible andalluring “blue bird” for us.Turks accepted neither the Wilson solution, nor our objections, nor theSévres Treaty. Instead of vacating Armenian lands, they were heavilyarming and consolidating their positions. The allies on the other hand,showed no intention of forcing the rebel Ankara to submit. It was thereverse; they had started to flirt with them. It was as if they did not see thatwe were unsatisfied and they were busy straightening their own affairs.(I often use the words “we” and “our” and do not clarify thesepronouns. In many cases, I do not put any distinction between the party andthe masses of people. Here is another instance of the same psychology, thesame narrow scope, the same political short-sightedness)The agony of the Armenian Cause began in 1922. At theLondon Conference52 was heard for the first time the word “Home”. TheTreaty of Sévres was entirely forgotten. There was no question of anindependent Armenian State. Only a doubtful “Home” in someone else’shome. This was the blow dealt us in March. Things got worse at Lausannetoward the end of the year. No “Home” was demanded for us. The Turkspolitely refused everything. The Great Allies, in a desperate gesture,confessed and bewailed that they had done everything possible to help theArmenians but could not do anything.Then, here came comrade Tchicherin and offered in the nameof Soviet Russia to locate the Armenians of Turkey in Crimea, on the shores51 8-93, Section VI of this treaty signed between the Allies and Turkey on August 10, 1920 Armenia wasformally recognized by Turkey and the Allies as a “free and independent” state - a state more of themind than of fact -“ which was promptly deserted by the Allies, rescinded by the Turks, abused andmisgoverned by the Dashnags, and finally put to rout by the waiting Soviets.52 s a result, Italy entered the war on the Allied side, May 23, 1915.57of Volga, in Siberia. Thus, the “State” was reduced to a “Home”, and the“Home” was converted into colonies in Siberia. The mountain did not evengive birth to a mouse. . . This was the past.If we are to evaluate the work we did and the results weobtained, we must confess that we have nothing to boast about from thetime we declared the independence of our Republic. We must admit that ourburden to organize a State and lead it was far beyond our strength.We have always miscalculated and have always encounteredwith unpredictable situations because we have been unable to foresee them.And it is evident, to me at least, that it was on account of our ineptness,individually, that prevented us from conducting affairs of state properly. Wehad been unable to distinguish the State from the Party and have introducedparty mentality into matters of state. We have not been statesmen.Let no one take offense from these words, which are notspoken with any malice but are a mere self-estimation. Is it not true that Imyself have been among the incompetents on the front line, yourcollaborator, equally responsible in our defeat?I mentioned “responsibility”...I have had no courage so far to add thatwe were, most of the time,not aware of the responsibility we had taken uponus; and also we were not always sufficiently honest in connection with ourduties. I do not have the courage, because I have worries about whether Ican be sufficiently just. Yet, some people know about it and some day,perhaps some person who is more just than I am will come up talk about itmore justly.What is the present?We have a small Republic today between the River Aras(Araxes)and Lake Sevan, nominally free, but in reality one of the fringe countries ofthe re-established sovereign Russian Empire. There is no Turkish-Armenia,neither State nor Home, not even an international political Question anymore, killed and buried at Lausanne. Generally speaking, the Armenians inthe Dispersion are not a political element for Armenia today.I can say more: There are no longer any Armenians in the TurkishArmenia and it is out of the question that one day they will come back. Turkshave firmly closed the doors and a force, which will make them open thedoors, is nowhere to be seen.Nearly one million Armenians are living outside the borders of theRepublic; in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Northern Caucasia, Iran, Syria,Constantinople’s, and Balkans and even in all the countries of the world.Only a very small number of Armenians in the Dispersion were able tofind themselves a sanctuary in Armenia. Leaving out the temporarydifficulties, the too-narrow borders of the Republic do not permit massivemigration (the issue here is the possibility of migration of the peasants inArmenian vilayets to Armenia). On the other hand, the social identity of theArmenians living outside Southern Caucasia (the petty bourgeoisie who have58not had the chance to make a living in their plundered agriculturalcountry which is dependent on commercial centers) is no less a problem.The Armenians in the Dispersion are not considered to be one of theelements , which are the founders of the Armenian State. And the longer thisprocess takes, the more alienated they will feel.The Armenians in the colonies will perhaps be of some value for sometime as an element of the nation (and this situation is associated with howwe maintain our national ties and raise our national consciousness). Yet, onlythe part of the Armenian nation, which remained in Armenia and the bigpieces living in the neighboring republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan, are onlymeaningful in connection with being a state-founding element.The Armenian state must depend on them and must consolidate onthis basis.The Armenians in the colonies, at best, can be considered a kind ofreserve and assisting force(on a very modest scale) for an unknown future.The immediate subject of solicitude for the Armenian political mindmust be the existing Republic, Armenians who live in and around it. Iunderscore this sentence vigorously and call it to your special attention, forthat will be the starting point of our future action.What should the attitude of our Party be, towards this Republic, itsregime, and Government?This Republic is not independent; it is a part of Southern CaucasianFederation or even of Russia. Armenia is actually an autonomous state underthe supervision and control of Moscow.Can this satisfy our Party? Is this our political ideal?It certainly is not.I mentioned earlier that Armenian Revolutionary FederationDashnagzoutiun had involuntarily voted for the separation of Armenia fromRussia in the spring of 1918; We were afraid of separation then, we wantedto stay attached to Russia. Nevertheless, this does not mean that we dislikedindependence and that our ideal is being a satellite state.I definitely believe that Armenian Revolutionary FederationDashnagzoutiun, consciously or unconsciously, has always struggled for thepolitical liberation of the Armenian people.The meaning and essence, the historical mission, the power and valueof our Party is concerned with this point. Whatever his tendencies might be,there is not one single genuine Party member who has not been inspired bythe idea of independence or rather, by the aspiration of independence. Withinthis context, the scope of our Party is extremely broad and the number ofmembers is many times more than what has been recorded in the Partybooks.I already explained my views quite broadly in Chakatmart last year,so I do not believe I have the right to repeat them here now. However, I59want to add now, that the present fate of Armenia cannot be the idealDashnagzoutiun has cherished.We were the frantic advocates of the idea of federation (we still are)and we know that Armenia, small as it is, cannot survive in any other way.However, we are for a federation where the states are federated with theirown volition and with equal rights. The present Russian Federation has notbeen structured on these grounds.The Armenian Republic is a Soviet Republic. The Soviet systemtheoretically envisages a class dictatorship. However, what is seen inArmenia now is the dictatorship of the Communist Party.Can this type of authority satisfy us?It certainly cannot.It is true that we have made an unsuccessful attempt at founding ourown dictatorship, but dictatorship (whether of party or class ) is not a religionfor us. We, who were poisoned with political power and inexperienced aboutgoverning a country, could not resist the attraction, but we stumbled.However, we eventually became aware of our mistake and started looking forways out; if we had been late, we would have fallen, for not only the“religion” but also the structure of our party was not also suitable for adictatorship. Armenia does not possess any class or stratum, party or group,which can establish a dictatorship relying only on its own force. Only anoutside power can establish a dictatorship in our country. It is as if ourcountry has been created for democracy; what we are deficient in is onlypolitical wisdom and the habits of governing a state.While this great deficiency makes it difficult to establish genuinedemocratic values, at the same time it eliminates the grounds for adictatorship fostered on interior dynamics.The socioeconomic life in the Soviet Union, and in Armenia for thatmatter, have been built on communist principles (or tried to be built).Do we find such a policy necessary and useful for Armenia?No, we do not.All this is not related with how conscious we are about socialism, whichis our Party’s banner, and how much we have absorbed it. Neither does itdepend on how compatible it is with our party’s structure and its collectiveideology.I am using this negative statement unconditionally but as an old andincorrigible communist I know from my own world outlook that not onlysimple communistic principles but also even a socialist order is not suitablefor the present day Armenia.Armenia is not mature enough for socialism and does not possess theminimum reasons, which would call for an attempt in this direction. All theattempts made in this direction are doomed to fail and especially is a crimecommitted against Armenian laborers.60I also took up this issue quite broadly in the Chakatmart journal.Since I do not see any disagreement on this among us, I suffice with theselines.+++++++++++++++++++++++As I have described above, neither the political situation in Armenianor its political system, its domestic socio-economic policies can satisfy us.We want not the present republic but another one.Consequently, what should our stand be towards this republic, itsregime and government?The simple and short answer is: We must struggle against it.However, when complicated issues and affairs are in question, simpleand short answers might be wrong.Political parties are not institutions where abstract topics are taken upand solved on a theoretical basis; the raison d’etre of political parties is notdeveloping theories (it is a secondary work) but action and action performedin the existing concrete conditions.When we think in these terms, (which we must, otherwise, we willmake grave mistakes) the answer will be different.A struggle requires a definite aim and concrete and useful means toreach that aim.What means do we possess and what use can they bring us ?If the Soviet system allowed for civil liberties, as the opposition, wewould express ourselves in the press and in public meetings openly; wewould criticize the erroneous policies of the Soviets; we would gathersupporters on our side; we would organize the discontented and resistingelements.If the Soviet system allowed for political equality, we would participatein the election campaigns, try to find ourselves posts in the Soviets and tryto cause certain alterations in the laws and regulations.However, the Soviet authority wishes to accept neither civil libertiesnor political equality.This authority is a party dictatorship (let us call it a class dictatorship).It is certainly possible to deplore it, to complain or get angry about it but itwill change nothing and the reality will stay the same: we have no place asthe opposition in Armenia.I am talking about Armenia itself, because I do not think an oppositionoutside Armenia will be of any use to us.It is possible for us to talk and write about any issue we want in thecolonies. What we need is only some paper, a printing-house and some61money, and nothing more. However, what can the public opinion in theArmenian colonies in Romania, or in Egypt (accepting that such a publicopinion can be created) mean for the Soviet Armenia?Our voice in the press might be taken secretly to Armenia. In the past,in the Tsarist regime, we used to take the Droshak and other publicationssecretly to the country, and at present, if I am not mistaken, the EsErs aresecretly taking the publications they have published abroad, to Russia. I haveno idea about what they might be hoping for and how successful they willbe in this secret propaganda. However, I am asking this: Taking intoconsideration our realities and conditions, could these declarationspublished secretly and to be read only by a few hundred people have anysignificance in the face of numerous publications the Bolsheviks have beensupplying throughout the country?The most important thing we do not possess and will not possess isslogans, which are understandable for the people and which might excite themasses of people.Let us take this up later.Is it possible to make a settlement with the Bolsheviks?It seems incredible but in the past, we thought this naïve attitudepossible and attempted at organizational cooperation with the Bolsheviks.Yes, it certainly is incredible because such a suggestion is misunderstandingthe essence of Bolshevism. Bolshevism is monarchic. Those who do notsupport it (or those who are not absolutely neutral politically) are against it.It should not be forgotten that according to the Bolsheviks, we are a party ofthe petty bourgeoisie which, for me, is not a mistake (if we take into accountnot only the party program and the individual standpoints of the individualparty leaders, but the actual structure of the party and its collective ideology,this definition is not at all unrealistic). If the Bolsheviks are intoleranttowards the Marxists, the Mensheviks and the socialist revolutionaries, theycannot naturally tolerate the Armenian Revolutionary FederationDashnagzoutiun as well.Why should the Bolsheviks cooperate with us?We have always liked to point out and persuade ourselves and othersthat if the Bolsheviks do not cooperate with us, they will not be able togovern Armenia.What is the basis for these threats of ours? Why should the Bolsheviksbelieve that we are essential for them?We have been expelled from Armenia or have been stifled inside thecountry for two years. Have the Bolsheviks encountered any obstacle, whichmay threaten their existence, should we not come to their aid? I knownothing of these obstacles and tend to think that such obstacles do not exist.We certainly are worthy people as simple citizens, but which party orgovernment abandons its political line or cooperates with its adversaries inorder to attract a few hundred people to its side?62Whatever the circumstances, whether we are right or wrong, orwhether we have too much brains or too little, the Bolsheviks are not lookingfor ways to cooperate with us and they do not accept this.There have been attempts in this direction and have received negativeanswers. A new attempt will be not only absurd but also degrading.It will be absurd because there are borders, which the party cannotpass over, as regards its political honor.The remaining possibilities are either secret, clandestine, conspiratoryor more general revolutionary activities, for we have been pursued by thegovernments of both the Tsar and the Sultan. Are not we capable of doing inthe Soviet Armenia what we did in the Turkish Armenia, for tens of years?We certainly are.We might establish a base in the Iranian Karadağ and send people andarms to the other side of Aras (Araxe), (just as we did in Salmas once). Wemight establish the necessary secret relations and establish armed “humb'sin the Sünik and Dereleğez mountains just as we did in the Sasun mountainsand the Çatak stream. We might provoke the peasants in some regionsdifficult to access, to rise and then we might expel the communists there ordestroy them. Later we might create great commotion even in Yerevan andoccupy a state building at least for a few hours just as we occupied theOttoman Bank or we might explode any building. We could planassassinations and execute them just as we killed the officials of the Tsar andthe Sultan and kill a few Bolsheviks; in the same way, just as we did toSultan Abdulhamid, we could plant a bomb under Myasnikov’s or Lukashin’sfeet.We could do all these, I think we could.However, there is this question: Why? What are our aims and hopes?When we created a great hubbub in Turkey, we thought we wouldattract the attention of the great powers to the Armenian cause and wouldforce them to mediate for us, but now we know what such mediation isworth and do not need to repeat such endeavors. If Europe has not beenable to help us in Turkey, Russia will never be able to do it, nor will theywish to do it. As a method of controlling separate individuals, terror mighthave been of some use on the Kurdish troublemakers or the officials of theTsar. However, we have to admit that the Bolsheviks are of a different fiber.If there is to be terror on both sides, the Bolsheviks will not be short of it, onthe contrary, they will leave us behind in that respect.When we use terror on one single person, they will use it on masses.Are we capable of turning the tendencies among the people into a civilwar? This is very disputable, but possible. If we take a very serious decisionand we persistently strive for it and do not prove very particular about themeans, we may succeed…..But why?When the Bolsheviks are strongly in power in Russia and when in ourback, there is Turkey in alliance with the Bolsheviks, is it possible to expelthe Bolsheviks from Armenia?63I think not even one such naïve person who might believe thiscan be found among our ranks. If there is a civil war, it is going to result inour defeat. Bolshevism is not an Armenian regime and the place where it isgoing to be buried will not be (does it have to be buried?) Armenia. ArmenianBolshevism is an extension and only a small part of Russian Bolshevism. Asthe Red Banner swings in Russia, it will inevitably swing in Yerevan too. Wewould have thought otherwise in 1918 but we have no right to do so now.However, Bolshevism has resolute adversaries in Russia and otherplaces, at least in neighboring places like Georgia and Azerbaijan, if notanywhere else. Is it not natural that we should come together with the otherdisconcerted people and try to destroy this communist dictatorship?Yes, it might be natural. However, the problem is that we should notdo it.The Armenian people have already been so much harmed, exhausted,and weakened that nobody has the right to put them under new tests anddemand new sacrifices from them. What has been done must be consideredsufficient. Let us wait for the anti-Bolshevik Russia to deal with theBolsheviks themselves. We will not be involved in it! Armenian people havedeserved to rest for a while and heal their severe wounds. If some people donot want to grant us this right and some people do not like this stand thatwe take, let them be.Let me go a step further to explain my thoughts. I ask myself: if, by amiracle, the existence of Bolsheviks in Armenia depended on myself, if itwere possible for me to remove them from Armenia in a single second, bythe movement of a single finger of mine, would I make that movement? Ianswer without hesitation that I would not. Not only would I not do it, but Iwould cut off my entire hand so that even in my dream, by mistake orinadvertently, I might not be able to make that dangerous movementIn the present conditions, the Bolsheviks are necessary for Armenia;there is no other power to replace them; this is the reality.Since the first days of our State, we have very well known that acountry like Armenia which is so small, poor, plundered and broken apartfrom the rest of the world cannot be really independent and self-governing.We have realized that we needed a support or some outside force, so that wewould be able to maintain our own existence by relying on it, at least in thefirst phases, until we organized and gathered our forces. We sought for sucha support first in distant America, and later in Europe. The results areobvious. Two or three years ago, we might have had some hope, but todaythere is no hope and insisting on it would be an unforgivable naïveté. Whatthe distant and uncertain future will bring us is not yet known. Nevertheless,the visible future is very clear at present: Today there are two actual forcesand we have to take them into consideration: Russia and Turkey. Thecircumstances have developed that way and our country is a satellite state ofRussia and is capable of protecting itself more than sufficiently from theattacks of Turkey. If Russian authority is lifted, Turkish-Tatar authority willsubstitute it. Either Russia or Turkey; either the Bolsheviks or the Turkishnationalists; we have no other choice.64While we are facing such alternatives, we should not entertainany doubts. We will certainly choose Russia, not Turkey; and the Bolsheviks,not the Turkish nationalists.If our alternatives had not been so limited, we would have had manyobjections to Russia in general and to the Bolsheviks in particular. Ourcalamity is our geographic position, which binds us.Armenia needs the Bolsheviks because it needs Russia.What will happen tomorrow is unknown (I think what is happening nowis also going to happen tomorrow), but it is Russia that is dominant today.Today, in order to have friendly relations with Russia, Armenia mustbe Bolshevik itself. There is no other way; I at least see it that way.The words I uttered above, i.e. “We have no slogans to be able tocarry out an anti-Bolshevik struggle in Armenia” must be appraised withinthis context.I am asking the same question in another way, this time about thepast.Was the arrival of the Bolsheviks a calamity for our country? This is anunexpected question coming from a Dashnag. The Bolsheviks are necessaryin Armenia under the present political conditions and there is not other forcethat could take their place. This is the truth. Let us not be carried by narrowpolitical ideas.I do not like to repeat that the Soviet regime is not at all suitable forArmenian reality, I think this view is indisputable.On the other hand, I know the Bolshevik activities in Armenia quitewell and I remember them; I mean the two and a half months when I was inArmenia (December 1921-February 1922). I know and I remember howmany people suffered; it was the Dashnags who suffered primarily. I myselfand many of you were immensely persecuted and pursuedI would like to add that we should never forget these grave issues andbe cautious when we are taking a decision; for as the injured party, we areinclined to see only the negative aspects and exaggerate everything.When I remember the conditions we were in November 1920, I askmyself: “Would not it have been better if the Bolsheviks had not occupiedour country and had left it to its own fate to be governed by us?” My answeris negative: No, it would not have been better, it would have been worse.We were already in those days aware of the irreparable situation andopened all the doors to the Bolsheviks.I have already stated above: all our hopes were in vain. We could getneither political nor material aid from Russia (I am again talking about thefirst phase). For example, the Bolsheviks did not defend Armenia againstTurkey and approved the Guru Agreement we had signed under the threat ofvanishing. This is the reality.If Bolsheviks had not occupied our country and if we had been alone,would the Turks have abided by the agreement, would they not have gone65any further under various pretexts (which are not difficult to create)?What would we have done in face of these intentions? We were defeated andweakened and had lost our authority inside and outside the country; whatwould we have done ?We had exhausted all our resources, had come to an impasse asGovernment and as Party in the fall of 1920. Had the Bolsheviks delayedtheir arrival, we, ourselves, would have asked them to come because wewere so weakened and powerless and there was no other force in thecountry to replace us.Look at the consequences of their coming:We governed our country for two and a half years; it is nearly twoand a half years the Bolsheviks have governed it. We had wars with Georgia,Azerbaijan, and Turkey. The Bolsheviks have had none. We had continualinternal fights – Agapapa (Akbaba), Zot (Zod), Zanki-Bazar (Zengibasar),Vedi-Bazar (Vedibasar), the valleys of Milli (Milin), Sharour(Şerur)Nakhichevan (Nahcivan), Zangezour (Zengezur). The Bolsheviks have hadno internal fights, except those in connection with the “Februarian” revolt.We had kept the entire country under arms, in constant fighting, we had keptall working hands on the battlefields at all time when there was the greatestdemand for construction work. The Bolsheviks have freed the people fromthat calamity, from that heavy burden.In our time the people were decimated or exhausted fromfamine. We destroyed bread-producing lands like Sharour and Veti (Vedi),cattle lands like Agapapa (Akbaba), wantonly and without benefit to us. Wegave to the armies of Kazim Karabekir (along with much other wealth) theharvest of 1920 - the only abundant one since the famine years. Today, Ihear Armenia is not hungry any more, is not clamoring for bread, onemight say, and I believe it because the people had time to sow and toreap.We tried hard to re-establish communication with the outerworld but did not succeed. The Bolsheviks did it. During our time Armeniagroped in darkness, all movement and activity ceased half an hour aftersunset because we had no means for providing lighting. The Bolsheviksbrought much kerosene from Baku and saved the country from the slavery ofdarkness. Of course these things are not very important you might say, butis it not a fact that we could not achieve even that little? The Bolsheviks werenecessary for Armenia then and they are necessary for Armenia today.Nevertheless, the Bolshevik system in its entirety is not acceptable forus. But what can we do? Perhaps, fight it from without? This might be ofsome use perhaps, if it is used to support the war inside, fought overtly orcovertly. Otherwise, what would the use be of a commotion created outsidethe country?European cities are full of emigrant malcontents of all kinds whopublish newspapers, write books, call protest meetings, threaten, and curethe Bolsheviks. . . I know of no other “work” that is more futile and miserablethan what is being done. Is it with these thundering words that they will blowoff Soviet heads? That is not a fight nor a struggle but an exposition of adespicable stupidity. The fighters against the Bolsheviks must fight from66within so that the blow may tell; but to hide behind the frontiers and showone’s fist from a safe distance -- it is a gesture, which, at all events, is notworthy of Dashnagzoutiun.To fight from without, to carry on an anti-Bolshevikpropaganda from abroad, when our words are not heard inside the country,is an inane and indecent thing.There are people among us who think Dashnagzoutiun should help theregeneration of Armenia from without by staying in the opposite camp.How?Various commercial and industrial companies should establishmanufactories, factories, irrigation canals etc, in order to import goods intoArmenia and to export raw materials to the external markets.Leaving aside how competent we are, as a party, in such commercialand industrial issues or in charity work of providing assistance and protectionto the needy, and how desired our mediation might be in respect to achievinga definite solution, I have this question to ask: can a political party includesuch work in its program? I think not. These are not among the issues aparty should deal with. This would not be the political program of a party, buta repudiation of it.If Dashnagzoutiun resorts to such ways, if it prefers this direction, itmust declare that it has lost its own raison d’etre.We must leave trade to traders, industry to industrialists and aid-toaidorganizations. Dashnagzoutiun should deal with other work (if there besuch work).Yes, if there be…As a political party, we cannot cooperate with the Bolsheviks within thecountry, in connection with the state work they are doing; similarly, wecannot be in the position of the official opposition no matter how much wewish it.We should not be carrying out any clandestine work; we should notdestroy the Soviet state power even if it were possible.While we feel no urge or wish to fight within the country, fighting onlyorally from without and carrying on an anti-Bolshevik propaganda fromabroad in the colonies is an inane and indecent thing.Helping the economic development of a country from abroad,establishing commercial and industrial companies, on the other hand, is notwhat a political party should do.What are we to do then?It is here that I shall say the very grave word, which, I know willembarrass you, but which must be said at last, and said simply, withoutconcealment or attenuation: THE ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARYFEDERATION HAS NOTHING TO DO ANYMORE.67Our Party had done everything it could do and isexhausted. New conditions of existence present new demands and we areunfit to respond. We must therefore leave the field to others abler thanourselves.Is it necessary to repeat again the new conditions? Here they are:Turkish Armenia does not exist anymore; half the Armenian peoplehave been massacred, others are dispersed in the four corners of the world,the other half is homeless and bleeding, in need of long rest andrecuperation; the Armenian Republic is united with Communist Russia as anautonomous state; to separate our State from Russia we cannot, even if wewish - and we must not wish it, even if we were able to do so; the Party isbeaten and has lost its authority, has been expelled from the country, cannotreturn home, while in the colonies it has no work.This is the situation today.The Party cannot say “I shall therefore create work for me” no matterwhat kind of work. That “therefore” is a mistake of logic. The sentence mustbe reversed to : “because I have no work to do I must cease to exist. Workis not for the existence of the Party, but it is the Party that must exist to dothe work, and where there is no work for the Party, there can be no Party.When I said the Dashnagzoutiun has nothing to do anymore, I didnot express myself correctly. It has one more final thing to do, a supremeduty to the Armenian Cause and toward its own past. It must, and by itsown decision, with full cognizance, decisively end its existence.Yes, I suggest suicide.There are, sometimes, such situations where an honorable way out isonly suicide. Our Party is in such a situation now.We should have done this four or five years ago. When we signed theagreement in Batoum in June 1918 and when an independent Armenian statewas born as a consequence of this agreement and took its modest placeamong other states, in the month of August that year, when we opened theArmenian Parliament which was going to shape the new state… We shouldhave abolished our Party then, and opened the way for new political groups.Our historical mission had been completed. This would have been a veryhonorable consequence of a long and arduous work of a quarter of a centurywith bloody struggles and great sacrifices.However, we did not understand then, that history was entering a newphase and in this phase the forces had to realign. We did not understand anddid not have the courage to understand.It might have been a forgivable behavior not to understand this four orfive years ago in the midst of revolutionary fever, but the situation is veryclear today and the new demands of life are very assertive.Failing to understand this reality now means that both of our eyes areblind. If we do not show determination now, only a fall and an dishonorableend will be waiting for us.68It is with their work that the parties live. If there is no work and inits place there is only imitation, death is inevitable.The ARF Dashnagzoutiun must purge its ranks unconditionally, to beable to save its life and future; and expel the unreliable, the confused, thetired, those who do not firmly believe and who are hopeless, the lazy andthe indifferent, that is to say, nine out of ten, perhaps more, of the partymembers. After this, only the cadres who have been closely examined,those who are morally strong, those who are firm believers and who canmake every sacrifice and will not be obstructed in any circumstances willremain and these cadres will have to do underground work. This will certainlynot be a political party. It will be a conspiracy organization.Our Party can save itself by this means and only by this means, canwe revive and carry the banner.At what price?At the price of risking the Armenian political question, and leaving theArmenian people face to face with new ordeals in the case of a failure. Insuch a case, the party leaders should not shrink but resolutely stand againstthis obstacle.However loyal we might be to the Party ideology, I do not want tobelieve that there is even one single person who would consciously like tosave the party at such a price.The Party is not an aim and anyone who forgets this basic reality,should be considered a traitor and a dangerous and harmful person. TheArmenian people are not a raw material for the Dashnagzoutiun. If we are toact- consciously or unconsciously - like a person who is suffering from partyfanaticism, we would be committing a capital crime.ARF Dashnagzoutiun was a tool in the hands of history. When a toolhas done its job, when it is also worn out or when the rest of the processrequires a new tool, the old tool is cast away and it must be cast away. Atool, which belongs to the past, can be kept only as a sign of affection andcult, but its place is the national museum.In the context of carrying on with the Armenian political question,Dashnagzoutiun is useless from now on and therefore, must depart from thescene.I am constantly talking about the Armenian political question, andgoing back to the same subject, because I cannot separate Dashnagzoutiunfrom this question. I can see the whole existence of our Party within thisquestion. Thus, it is only natural that I cannot find another standpoint to beable to argue in favor of my convictions and to determine the direction thatmy thoughts will take, as I am addressing this Dashnagzoutiun Congress.I ask you, would the political liberation of our country, which has beenour aim and work thus far, die with us? It would be extreme megalomania onour part to think so - not only megalomania but a very naïve conception of69historical facts. It is for the very purpose of assuring our NationalCause, not to do any harm to it, that I propose the dissolution of our PartyOne year ago, although I wrote in Chakatamarta about how harmfulthe death of ARF Dashnagzoutiun would be to the Armenian question, at thesame time, I also stated in the same place, that the actual borders ofDashnagzoutiun have greatly gone beyond our Party organizations; ourParty is only one aspect of the Armenian cause, in struggle. The name,Dashnagzoutiun may very well be lost, forgotten but the proud spirit, whichgave birth to Dashnagzoutiun, the spirit of freedom will never die and this isthe real Dashnagzoutiun. The Party, that is to say, the present organizationmight dissolve but the mission and the work will survive.It will never die but even gain a new joy of life.And for this reason alone- in order that it may be guaranteed and thatit may develop further in future- I suggest that the Party commit suicide.There is one thing that we must understand: The Armenian Bolshevikswho will succeed us have to take up our work and they have taken it up.They have to do it whether or not they are aware of it and whether or notthey want to do it. They are, just like us, a tool in the hands of the greatmaster, History. We have done our job, completed a phase, and now theremainder is up to them.We have to be thankful to the Bolsheviks. They established the samework on surer grounds (if not saved it), by overthrowing us. At that criticalmoment when we were overpowered by our own work, they took our place.Our struggle has not died.Yes, it is true, Armenia, today, is not an independent country, it is justan autonomous region under the authority of the Russian Federation, buthow can we know?; Perhaps it is the best solution for Armenia today.The reality has confirmed this: Hastily founding a sovereign stateunder the present unfavorable conditions is beyond the powers of theArmenian people. A class, which is politically prepared, is needed in order tobe able to attain a medium level of subsistence and to acquire the habitsconnected with state affairs. Following great upheavals, massacres andplunder, this class needs a peaceful period to get organized and to gatherforce. In the developing conditions, Armenia has to live this period underBolshevik banner. Let it be so.The Dashnagzoutiun cannot assist the Bolsheviks. It is necessary thatit may not be overthrown, and in order that it may not be upset theDashnagzoutiun has only one means - to depart from the scene.We very often hear that following one single political line will not besufficient in order to solve our problem; for caution requires that onetendency should be accompanied by another parallel tendency. The ArmenianBolsheviks are following the Russian line; let them follow it, but otherpossibilities should also be kept in mind. For example, today, the RussianBolsheviks are in the same front with the Turks, but tomorrow this artificialbloc may fall to pieces and we may have to find a common language with theTurks and the Europeans situated in their back. Consequently, we may have70to maintain relations with the Turks of tomorrow. Although there isnothing left for Dashnagzoutiun to do, it must maintain its existence and itspresent anti-Bolshevik position at least for this purpose.I object to neither this possibility nor the existence of a secondpossibility.However, I insist on one point: This role is not suitable for ARFDashnagzoutiun. Dashnagzoutiun is a more unacceptable participator of talkswith Turks than with the Bolsheviks. If one day the need arises to hold talkswith the Turks, other people who have a different understanding, a differentpsychology and especially, a different past (or no past) must come to thescene. At this point, Dashnagzoutiun cannot be helpful but on the contrary,might constitute an obstacle.It is claimed that the Bolshevik regime and authority are not eternal.That is to say, Bolshevism may fall from power more or less unexpectedly, inthe short or long run. Consequently, a reserve force, another organization isneeded to substitute Bolshevism and to take hold of the leadership so thatthe country may not fall into anarchy.Dashnagzoutiun should at least be kept for those days.At this point, I would like to argue: Even if such a situation arises, Ideclare and I insist that the new authority will not be established byDashnagzoutiun.When the present conditions show a considerable change, the Sovietauthority, which does not suit the Armenian reality and is alien to it, willleave its place to other political and social groups; it will consider its ownrole accomplished and completed. However, the force that will substitute theBolsheviks is not Dashnagzoutiun.New conditions will bring new demands.Political (especially revolutionary) parties are not constantly renewed,trying to confirm to the demands of the day; they arise in certain periodsand perform certain duties, using certain means. A party cannot get rid of itspast, no matter how much it desires to. The past will always hover over thepresent and will surround it: Memories, habits, relations, sympathies, andantipathies will come to the surface and will insert a kind of anarchy into thedaily work.New wine is never stored in old barrels, because the barrel will breakdown and the wine will flow away.ARF Dashnagzoutiun was useful for Armenia and the Armenian causein the past. In the future, it will be of no use. Another Dashnagzoutiun,perhaps a Dashnagzoutiun of the Armenian Republic will occupy its place.There is nothing left for Dashnagzoutiun to do… Neither today, nortomorrow nor in the future. It must end its existence with its own hands. Itmust do this for the sake of its own past, to save its own name and honor.Let us look around: Are we actually living the present? Is this actuallya party activity and party life? Is it not clearly seen that we have already71entered a phase of corruption and the reasons for this corruption is notcoincidental and external but internal and organizational.The new generation, the youth is not with us (like they were 20-25years ago). No new forces full of enthusiasm and faith are joining our ranks,in order to substitute the weary and the ones who have lost their faith andcourage. On the contrary, they are running away from us, corrupting theparty; or only the ones who are useless, indifferent, unenergetic andunenthusiastic and who have no ability to work, remain; only the ones whobear the coldness of death in their hearts and who carry a slight irony ontheir lips remain with us.We do not want to see the reality and continue our old habit ofbringing monotonous explanations to events. We say: The bad and the selfinterested;the hired and the nerveless go away; the good and the sincere;the ones who are psychologically and mentally sane remain with us, as usual.Is this an explanation then? Is this not similar to the absurd explanationsmade by the Bolsheviks that the Dashnagzoutiun is composed of only thehired people of the bourgeoisie, of bandits, robbers, and all types ofadventurers?This is not an explanation; these are the words of either a naïve childor of an incorrigible demagogue.And since the Dashnagzoutiun has nothing else to do anymore -neither at the present time nor in the future, it must end its existence.Our Party has lost its “raison d’etre”, its reason for existence. This is thebitter truth. Shall we have the courage to confess the truth and arrive at theproper conclusion?And the only conclusion is that we must end our existence.
With comradely salutations,
Kindly provided by Mr Doğu Perinçek http://www.ip.org.tr/
Turkish Armenianshttp://armenians-1915.blogspot.com/
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