Below Extract from "Noah's Dove Returns" published on 21 April, 2009
European Stability Initiative (ESI)
www.esiweb.org
...As opposition to Turkey grew, demands for a Greater Armenia – the unification of historicalArmenian territories through revisions of the Turkish border – supplanted the goal ofliberation from Soviet rule. Increasingly, the diaspora political parties began to shelve theirdivisions to adopt a united front towards Turkey.A memorandum submitted by the threemain diaspora parties to the UN in 1975 demanded “the return of Turkish-held Armenianterritories to their rightful owner – the Armenian people”, along with “moral, financial andterritorial reparations.”
Like many Armenians, Kiro Manoyan and his family fled Lebanon during the civil war andemigrated to Canada, where he became active in the ARF network, now energised around acommon cause. In 2000, he came to Armenia and became the ARF’s spokesperson forforeign policy. To this day, Manoyan continues to reject the current border with Turkey. Inan interview with the Armenian daily Yerkir in April 2005, Manoyan explained thatArmenia will bring up the territorial dispute with its vastly more powerful neighbour as soonas the opportunity to do so presents itself.“We believe that Armenia is unable to make such demands today. But this doesn’t meanthat it will be unable to do so tomorrow. So it must not take any steps that would hamperor inhibit us tomorrow."
This remains the official ARF position. In a parliamentary debate in Yerevan in 2007, VahanHovhannisian, then deputy speaker of parliament and a leading ARF politician, described the1921 Treaties of Kars and Moscow, which define the current border, as “illegal” (despite theirhaving been ratified) and called for “very serious diplomatic, legal work” to revise them.Speaking at the same debate, Ara Papian, previously Yerevan’s ambassador to Canada, alsorejected the validity of the two treaties, arguing instead that the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, whichawarded Armenia a substantial part of eastern Anatolia (but was never ratified), remained inforce. Papian even calculated a precise figure, USD $41,514,230,940, to be paid by Turkeyin reparations for damages inflicted during World War I.
According to Armenians like Manoyan and Papian, the unresolved territorial issue is aninsurmountable obstacle to normal relations between the neighbouring countries. ArmenAyvazian, director of the Yerevan-based strategic research institute ‘Ararat’, for his part,argues that Armenia – if it is serious about pursuing its territorial demands – should notengage with Turkey at all.
“The solution to the Armenian question is not the international recognition of theArmenian genocide, as many misperceive it and as Armenia’s false friends aresuggesting. The Armenian Question is first of all a territorial question …. There is onlyone solution to the Armenian Question to restore Armenian statehood, if not in theentirety of Armenia (350,000 sq/km), then at least on a substantial piece of it, such thatthe safe and long-term existence and development of Armenian civilisation can besecured.”
Ayvazian likens present-day Armenia (29,800 sq/km) to a “lonely castle”, offering no placefor the nation to retreat and regroup its forces. This can never be accepted. Ayvazian alsoharshly criticises the Armenian authorities for being too soft on Turkey, particularly in lightof President Gul’s 2008 visit to Yerevan.
“While Israel confronts a Holocaust-denying Iran by all possible means, the Armeniangovernment invites the Armenian Genocide-denier Abdullah Gul to Armenia and promptsour people to respect the flag and anthem of the enemy.”
Maximalist positions like Ayvazian’s are still common among Armenians, both at home andabroad. As part of a political platform, however, they appear increasingly bankrupt, offeringno effective strategy or realistic perspective for advancing Armenian territorial claims. Whatis more, they have ceased to be effective as a tool for uniting Armenians, either at home or inthe diaspora.
At home, the ARF has never been able to win more than 14 percent of the vote. A juniorcoalition partner in the current government, their influence on foreign policy is limited.Tellingly, every Armenian government since independence has been in favour of openingdiplomatic relations with Turkey without any preconditions.
Even in the diaspora, positions are divided. While some Armenians oppose any contact withTurks whatsoever until Turkey admits the genocide, pays reparations, and returns territory in“Western Armenia”, others are open to engagement. The Armenian National Committee ofAmerica (ANCA), a network affiliated with the ARF, regarded the 2001 Turkish ArmenianReconciliation Commission, an effort by the US State Department to bring prominentArmenians and Turks together, as “a Turkish ploy intended to derail international recognitionof the Armenian genocide” and “a barrier to the genocide recognition campaign.” TheArmenian Assembly of America (AAA), on the other hand, took part in it.International recognition of the genocide, meanwhile, has not translated into internationalsupport for changing the borders, one of the ARF’s major aims. Third country resolutions andproclamations, acknowledged Simon Payaslian, a diaspora historian, “neglect the issues ofretribution, compensation and restitution; and they particularly ignore the fact that as a resultof the Genocide, Armenians lost their historic territories.” As a result, Armenian hardlinersare questioning the wisdom of fighting so hard for genocide recognition throughout the world.
As Papian put it“All of our resources went to the genocide. Well, it is all too obvious, if people weremassacred for their ethnicity that is genocide. It is senseless to argue whether thishappened or not”.
The Armenian nationalists’ “coarse and indiscriminate” discourse, writes Gerard Libaridian, aleading American Armenian intellectual and a former advisor to Armenian president LevonTer-Petrossian, “accused all Turks, past and present, of being party to the criminal action. Itwas, or appeared to be, a battle of all Armenians against all Turks ... The policy of denial ofthe genocide was seen as the mere manifestation of the evil nature of Turkey and of Turks.”
By linking genocide recognition to territorial claims, he adds, the nationalist discourse hasproven counterproductive.“Armenian political parties considered a Turkish recognition of the genocide as the firststep and the legal basis for territorial demands from Turkey. Even if there were no otherreasons, this linkage would have been sufficient for the Turkish state to deny thegenocide at all cost.”Asserting outright that “there is no logical connection between the cause of genociderecognition and that of retrieving land from Turkey,” historian Donald Bloxham has alsochallenged the Armenian nationalists to answer the fundamental question “whetherrecognition is really going to open the door to healing wounds and reconciliation, as we areoften told, or whether it is a means of redressing nationalist grievances. Is it an issue ofhistorical truth, morality and responsibility, or of unresolved political and material claims?”
In December 2007, Levon Ter-Petrossian (Armenia’s first president from 1991 to 1998)delivered a major policy speech at Yerevan’s Liberty Square as part of his presidentialelection campaign. After reminding his audience of his personal background – “I am adescendant of Genocide survivors. My grandfather fought in the heroic Battle of Musa Dagh.My seven-year old father carried food and water to the positions. And my mother was born inthose days in a cave. Had the French Navy not happened to have been sailing by the shores ofMusa Dagh I would not be alive now” – he set out the case for improving relations withTurkey“It is time to finally understand that by presenting ultimatums to Turkey or pushing it intoa corner, no-one can force it to recognise the Armenian Genocide. I have absolutely nodoubt that Turkey will do so – sooner or later. Yet it will not happen before thenormalisation of Armenian-Turkish relations, but after the establishment of anatmosphere of good-neighbourliness, cooperation and trust between our countries.Consequently, emotions aside, these relations must be built on the basis of the reality thatArmenia considers the events of 1915 to be Genocide, whereas Turkey does not.”
Ter-Petrossian did not object to Armenians in the diaspora working to achieve genociderecognition. As he put it, “The sons and daughters of the Armenian Diaspora, as citizens,taxpayers, and voters of different countries, have the right to exert pressure on theirgovernments.” Armenia’s interest, however, was not in lobbying against Turkey abroad, butin seeing Turkey succeed in becoming a prosperous European democracy. Armenianauthorities’ attempts to undermine Turkey’s EU accession process were thus a sign of“incompetence”
“Isn’t it obvious that Turkey’s accession to the EU is in Armenia’s best interest in allrespects – economic, political, and security? What is more dangerous – Turkey as an EUmember, or Turkey that has been rejected by the West, and has turned therefore to theEast? Or, what is more preferable Armenia isolated from the West, or Armenia thatshares a border with the European Union? Our country’s foreign policy should haveanswered these simple questions long ago.”
Even before Armenia declared its independence from the Soviet Union, Ter-Petrossian likedto evoke the fate of the first Armenian republic, which lasted less than two years between1918 and 1920. To avoid this fate, he believed that Armenia needed a balanced foreignpolicy, and in particular good relations with Turkey. Six months before Armenia’sindependence, Ter-Petrossian met with Volkan Vural, the Turkish Ambassador to Moscow,assuring him that“Armenia is changing, and in this new world we should be neighbour states with newthinking. We want to become friends. We are ready for any type of mutually beneficialcooperation. Armenia has no territorial claims towards Turkey.”
In the end, however, Ter-Petrossian did not succeed in establishing diplomatic relations withTurkey. When he was pushed out of office by Robert Kocharian, the former leader of thebreak-away republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, many among the new leadership in Yerevanwrote off the former president’s policy of accommodation as a failure. Kocharian brought theARF (Dashnak) party, which had been outlawed, into his government, and decided to workmore closely with the Armenian diaspora. He organised the first big Armenian diasporaconference in Yerevan in September 1999. He also made the issue of international genociderecognition a priority of Armenian foreign policy. While assuring Turkey that genociderecognition would not give rise to territorial claims, he made few efforts to reach out toTurkey – pointing out, at the same time, that “it is not us keeping the Armenian-Turkishborder closed.”
In April 2008, Robert Kocharian was succeeded by his former prime minister, SerzhSarkisian, who had defeated Ter-Petrossian in the polls. During the election campaign, somemedia outlets had portrayed Ter-Petrossian as a Turkophile, referring to him as ‘LevonEfendi’. However, once elected, Sarkisian decided to seek engagement with Armenia’sWestern neighbour. Addressing Armenian diaspora representatives on 23 June 2008 inMoscow, he noted“Armenia’s position is clear; in the 21st century between neighbouring countries theremust not be closed borders. The regional cooperation could be the best means supportingstability. The Turkish side offers to form a commission that would be studying historicalfacts. We don’t oppose the creation of such a commission, but when the border betweenthe states is open.”
It was then that the new Armenian president invited his Turkish counterpart, Abdullah Gul, toYerevan. In an article in The Wall Street Journal on 9 July 2008, Sarkisian explained hisposition in more detail“The time has come for a fresh effort to break this deadlock, a situation that helps no oneand hurts many. As president of Armenia, I take this opportunity to propose a fresh start– a new phase of dialogue with the government and people of Turkey, with the goal ofnormalizing relations and opening our common border … There is no real alternative tothe establishment of normal relations between our countries.”When President Abdullah Gul decided to take up Sarkisian’s offer and visit Yerevan, theopposition Armenian National Congress led by Ter-Petrossian postponed a planned rally toprotest against president Sarkisian on 5 September. “We are supporters of the normalisationof Armenian-Turkish relations,” said the ANC in a statement, “and we do not wish in any wayto overshadow any event supporting the perspectives of those relations.” It was Kocharianwho expressed his disapproval. Asked, back in July 2008, to respond to allegations that hewas still “ruling the country” behind the scenes, he responded that “if that were true, LevonTer-Petrossian, most likely, would now already be in jail for criminal activity … and theTurkish President would not be invited for a football match to Yerevan for sure.” It wasnow Sarkisian’s turn to suffer charges of appeasement. Haykakan Jamanak, an oppositiondaily, accused the new president of making too many “concessions” to Turkey. Its coverfeatured Sarkisian – “Serzhik Efendi”, as the newspaper called him – wearing an Ottoman fez.It asked “What should one call such behaviour? Is it flattery, flirtation, self-interest or simplytreachery?”
Some Armenians still believe that Turkey cannot change. Suspicion of Turkey’s motives andfear of its true intentions are widespread, both on the street and in the media. In a 2004opinion poll, 68.7 percent of Armenian respondents, when asked to characterise Turks in asingle word, came up with negative descriptions – among them, “bloodthirsty” (6.4 percent),“enemy” (10.1 percent), “barbarian” (9.1 percent) and “murderers” (6.4 percent). Only 6percent of respondents cited positive characteristics.
European Stability Initiative (ESI)
www.esiweb.org
...As opposition to Turkey grew, demands for a Greater Armenia – the unification of historicalArmenian territories through revisions of the Turkish border – supplanted the goal ofliberation from Soviet rule. Increasingly, the diaspora political parties began to shelve theirdivisions to adopt a united front towards Turkey.A memorandum submitted by the threemain diaspora parties to the UN in 1975 demanded “the return of Turkish-held Armenianterritories to their rightful owner – the Armenian people”, along with “moral, financial andterritorial reparations.”
Like many Armenians, Kiro Manoyan and his family fled Lebanon during the civil war andemigrated to Canada, where he became active in the ARF network, now energised around acommon cause. In 2000, he came to Armenia and became the ARF’s spokesperson forforeign policy. To this day, Manoyan continues to reject the current border with Turkey. Inan interview with the Armenian daily Yerkir in April 2005, Manoyan explained thatArmenia will bring up the territorial dispute with its vastly more powerful neighbour as soonas the opportunity to do so presents itself.“We believe that Armenia is unable to make such demands today. But this doesn’t meanthat it will be unable to do so tomorrow. So it must not take any steps that would hamperor inhibit us tomorrow."
This remains the official ARF position. In a parliamentary debate in Yerevan in 2007, VahanHovhannisian, then deputy speaker of parliament and a leading ARF politician, described the1921 Treaties of Kars and Moscow, which define the current border, as “illegal” (despite theirhaving been ratified) and called for “very serious diplomatic, legal work” to revise them.Speaking at the same debate, Ara Papian, previously Yerevan’s ambassador to Canada, alsorejected the validity of the two treaties, arguing instead that the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, whichawarded Armenia a substantial part of eastern Anatolia (but was never ratified), remained inforce. Papian even calculated a precise figure, USD $41,514,230,940, to be paid by Turkeyin reparations for damages inflicted during World War I.
According to Armenians like Manoyan and Papian, the unresolved territorial issue is aninsurmountable obstacle to normal relations between the neighbouring countries. ArmenAyvazian, director of the Yerevan-based strategic research institute ‘Ararat’, for his part,argues that Armenia – if it is serious about pursuing its territorial demands – should notengage with Turkey at all.
“The solution to the Armenian question is not the international recognition of theArmenian genocide, as many misperceive it and as Armenia’s false friends aresuggesting. The Armenian Question is first of all a territorial question …. There is onlyone solution to the Armenian Question to restore Armenian statehood, if not in theentirety of Armenia (350,000 sq/km), then at least on a substantial piece of it, such thatthe safe and long-term existence and development of Armenian civilisation can besecured.”
Ayvazian likens present-day Armenia (29,800 sq/km) to a “lonely castle”, offering no placefor the nation to retreat and regroup its forces. This can never be accepted. Ayvazian alsoharshly criticises the Armenian authorities for being too soft on Turkey, particularly in lightof President Gul’s 2008 visit to Yerevan.
“While Israel confronts a Holocaust-denying Iran by all possible means, the Armeniangovernment invites the Armenian Genocide-denier Abdullah Gul to Armenia and promptsour people to respect the flag and anthem of the enemy.”
Maximalist positions like Ayvazian’s are still common among Armenians, both at home andabroad. As part of a political platform, however, they appear increasingly bankrupt, offeringno effective strategy or realistic perspective for advancing Armenian territorial claims. Whatis more, they have ceased to be effective as a tool for uniting Armenians, either at home or inthe diaspora.
At home, the ARF has never been able to win more than 14 percent of the vote. A juniorcoalition partner in the current government, their influence on foreign policy is limited.Tellingly, every Armenian government since independence has been in favour of openingdiplomatic relations with Turkey without any preconditions.
Even in the diaspora, positions are divided. While some Armenians oppose any contact withTurks whatsoever until Turkey admits the genocide, pays reparations, and returns territory in“Western Armenia”, others are open to engagement. The Armenian National Committee ofAmerica (ANCA), a network affiliated with the ARF, regarded the 2001 Turkish ArmenianReconciliation Commission, an effort by the US State Department to bring prominentArmenians and Turks together, as “a Turkish ploy intended to derail international recognitionof the Armenian genocide” and “a barrier to the genocide recognition campaign.” TheArmenian Assembly of America (AAA), on the other hand, took part in it.International recognition of the genocide, meanwhile, has not translated into internationalsupport for changing the borders, one of the ARF’s major aims. Third country resolutions andproclamations, acknowledged Simon Payaslian, a diaspora historian, “neglect the issues ofretribution, compensation and restitution; and they particularly ignore the fact that as a resultof the Genocide, Armenians lost their historic territories.” As a result, Armenian hardlinersare questioning the wisdom of fighting so hard for genocide recognition throughout the world.
As Papian put it“All of our resources went to the genocide. Well, it is all too obvious, if people weremassacred for their ethnicity that is genocide. It is senseless to argue whether thishappened or not”.
The Armenian nationalists’ “coarse and indiscriminate” discourse, writes Gerard Libaridian, aleading American Armenian intellectual and a former advisor to Armenian president LevonTer-Petrossian, “accused all Turks, past and present, of being party to the criminal action. Itwas, or appeared to be, a battle of all Armenians against all Turks ... The policy of denial ofthe genocide was seen as the mere manifestation of the evil nature of Turkey and of Turks.”
By linking genocide recognition to territorial claims, he adds, the nationalist discourse hasproven counterproductive.“Armenian political parties considered a Turkish recognition of the genocide as the firststep and the legal basis for territorial demands from Turkey. Even if there were no otherreasons, this linkage would have been sufficient for the Turkish state to deny thegenocide at all cost.”Asserting outright that “there is no logical connection between the cause of genociderecognition and that of retrieving land from Turkey,” historian Donald Bloxham has alsochallenged the Armenian nationalists to answer the fundamental question “whetherrecognition is really going to open the door to healing wounds and reconciliation, as we areoften told, or whether it is a means of redressing nationalist grievances. Is it an issue ofhistorical truth, morality and responsibility, or of unresolved political and material claims?”
In December 2007, Levon Ter-Petrossian (Armenia’s first president from 1991 to 1998)delivered a major policy speech at Yerevan’s Liberty Square as part of his presidentialelection campaign. After reminding his audience of his personal background – “I am adescendant of Genocide survivors. My grandfather fought in the heroic Battle of Musa Dagh.My seven-year old father carried food and water to the positions. And my mother was born inthose days in a cave. Had the French Navy not happened to have been sailing by the shores ofMusa Dagh I would not be alive now” – he set out the case for improving relations withTurkey“It is time to finally understand that by presenting ultimatums to Turkey or pushing it intoa corner, no-one can force it to recognise the Armenian Genocide. I have absolutely nodoubt that Turkey will do so – sooner or later. Yet it will not happen before thenormalisation of Armenian-Turkish relations, but after the establishment of anatmosphere of good-neighbourliness, cooperation and trust between our countries.Consequently, emotions aside, these relations must be built on the basis of the reality thatArmenia considers the events of 1915 to be Genocide, whereas Turkey does not.”
Ter-Petrossian did not object to Armenians in the diaspora working to achieve genociderecognition. As he put it, “The sons and daughters of the Armenian Diaspora, as citizens,taxpayers, and voters of different countries, have the right to exert pressure on theirgovernments.” Armenia’s interest, however, was not in lobbying against Turkey abroad, butin seeing Turkey succeed in becoming a prosperous European democracy. Armenianauthorities’ attempts to undermine Turkey’s EU accession process were thus a sign of“incompetence”
“Isn’t it obvious that Turkey’s accession to the EU is in Armenia’s best interest in allrespects – economic, political, and security? What is more dangerous – Turkey as an EUmember, or Turkey that has been rejected by the West, and has turned therefore to theEast? Or, what is more preferable Armenia isolated from the West, or Armenia thatshares a border with the European Union? Our country’s foreign policy should haveanswered these simple questions long ago.”
Even before Armenia declared its independence from the Soviet Union, Ter-Petrossian likedto evoke the fate of the first Armenian republic, which lasted less than two years between1918 and 1920. To avoid this fate, he believed that Armenia needed a balanced foreignpolicy, and in particular good relations with Turkey. Six months before Armenia’sindependence, Ter-Petrossian met with Volkan Vural, the Turkish Ambassador to Moscow,assuring him that“Armenia is changing, and in this new world we should be neighbour states with newthinking. We want to become friends. We are ready for any type of mutually beneficialcooperation. Armenia has no territorial claims towards Turkey.”
In the end, however, Ter-Petrossian did not succeed in establishing diplomatic relations withTurkey. When he was pushed out of office by Robert Kocharian, the former leader of thebreak-away republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, many among the new leadership in Yerevanwrote off the former president’s policy of accommodation as a failure. Kocharian brought theARF (Dashnak) party, which had been outlawed, into his government, and decided to workmore closely with the Armenian diaspora. He organised the first big Armenian diasporaconference in Yerevan in September 1999. He also made the issue of international genociderecognition a priority of Armenian foreign policy. While assuring Turkey that genociderecognition would not give rise to territorial claims, he made few efforts to reach out toTurkey – pointing out, at the same time, that “it is not us keeping the Armenian-Turkishborder closed.”
In April 2008, Robert Kocharian was succeeded by his former prime minister, SerzhSarkisian, who had defeated Ter-Petrossian in the polls. During the election campaign, somemedia outlets had portrayed Ter-Petrossian as a Turkophile, referring to him as ‘LevonEfendi’. However, once elected, Sarkisian decided to seek engagement with Armenia’sWestern neighbour. Addressing Armenian diaspora representatives on 23 June 2008 inMoscow, he noted“Armenia’s position is clear; in the 21st century between neighbouring countries theremust not be closed borders. The regional cooperation could be the best means supportingstability. The Turkish side offers to form a commission that would be studying historicalfacts. We don’t oppose the creation of such a commission, but when the border betweenthe states is open.”
It was then that the new Armenian president invited his Turkish counterpart, Abdullah Gul, toYerevan. In an article in The Wall Street Journal on 9 July 2008, Sarkisian explained hisposition in more detail“The time has come for a fresh effort to break this deadlock, a situation that helps no oneand hurts many. As president of Armenia, I take this opportunity to propose a fresh start– a new phase of dialogue with the government and people of Turkey, with the goal ofnormalizing relations and opening our common border … There is no real alternative tothe establishment of normal relations between our countries.”When President Abdullah Gul decided to take up Sarkisian’s offer and visit Yerevan, theopposition Armenian National Congress led by Ter-Petrossian postponed a planned rally toprotest against president Sarkisian on 5 September. “We are supporters of the normalisationof Armenian-Turkish relations,” said the ANC in a statement, “and we do not wish in any wayto overshadow any event supporting the perspectives of those relations.” It was Kocharianwho expressed his disapproval. Asked, back in July 2008, to respond to allegations that hewas still “ruling the country” behind the scenes, he responded that “if that were true, LevonTer-Petrossian, most likely, would now already be in jail for criminal activity … and theTurkish President would not be invited for a football match to Yerevan for sure.” It wasnow Sarkisian’s turn to suffer charges of appeasement. Haykakan Jamanak, an oppositiondaily, accused the new president of making too many “concessions” to Turkey. Its coverfeatured Sarkisian – “Serzhik Efendi”, as the newspaper called him – wearing an Ottoman fez.It asked “What should one call such behaviour? Is it flattery, flirtation, self-interest or simplytreachery?”
Some Armenians still believe that Turkey cannot change. Suspicion of Turkey’s motives andfear of its true intentions are widespread, both on the street and in the media. In a 2004opinion poll, 68.7 percent of Armenian respondents, when asked to characterise Turks in asingle word, came up with negative descriptions – among them, “bloodthirsty” (6.4 percent),“enemy” (10.1 percent), “barbarian” (9.1 percent) and “murderers” (6.4 percent). Only 6percent of respondents cited positive characteristics.
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